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A BETTER DEFENSE OF BIG WAIVER: 
FROM JAMES LANDIS TO LOUIS JAFFE 
YAIR SAGY* 
This Article is a rejoinder to Professors David J. Barron and Todd D. 
Rakoff’s article, In Defense of Big Waiver, recently published in the 
Columbia Law Review.  “Big Waiver” provisions, which figure 
prominently in the “No Child Left Behind” and the “Obamacare” 
legislation, authorize administrative agencies to displace the regulatory 
baseline established by Congress.  Propounding a defense of big waiver 
statutory provisions, Barron and Rakoff ground their argument in James 
Landis’s seminal work, The Administrative Process.  This Article shows, 
however, that Barron and Rakoff’s defense is misguided because it 
ignores Landis’s work’s focal point, the concept of administrative 
expertise, which had been widely discredited post-Landis.  This Article 
offers instead an innovative, alternative justification for big waiver 
regulation, which draws on Louis Jaffe’s construction of a decentralized, 
inter-branch dialogic theory of regulation.  Therefore, this Article 
operates on three levels.  On one level, it is a response to Barron and 
Rakoff.  On a second level, the Article offers an in-depth innovative 
analysis of the writings of two of the most influential thinkers on 
regulation, Landis and Jaffe.  In doing so, the Article questions the 
pervasive understanding of Landis’s work and promotes a novel reading 
of both Landis’s and Jaffe’s scholarship.  On yet a third level, this Article 
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valuable thoughts and suggestions, I thank Noah Feldman, Morton Horwitz, Robert 
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along the years.  A special thanks goes to Orna Rabisnovich-Einy and Shmuel Leshem, whose 
support and help made me finish the Article.  Finally, I am indebted to Ruthie Ben-David for 
wonderful research assistance. 
This Article is intellectually based on the investigation I have pursued in my J.S.D. 
Dissertation into theories of administrative expertise in the history of regulation in the United 
States.  See Yair Sagy, The Manager, the Judge, and the Empiricist: American Administrative 
Law as a Theory of Expertise (2006) (unpublished J.S.D. Dissertation, New York University) 
(on file with the New York University Law School Library), available at http://works.bepress.
com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1004&context=yair_sagy, archived at http://perma.cc/P58R-
5ARX.  The Article substantially reworks key parts of the analysis conducted therein.  It also 
introduces a series of new arguments as it focuses on some of the most burning issues of the 
present. 
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charts the contours of a new regulatory framework for the twenty-first 
century, which is rooted in the work of Jaffe. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION ................................................................................... 698 
II.  LANDIS AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS ................................ 703 
A.  Introduction: The New Deal’s Icon and Classic ....................... 703 
B.  Landis’s Odyssey: Three-Part Saga ........................................... 707 
C.  Prologue: On the Business of the Court and Legislation ........ 710 
D.  Landis and The Administrative Process .................................. 713 
1.  Some Context  ...................................................................... 713 
2.  And Expertise to All ........................................................... 715 
3.  A Duet of Expertise Types ................................................. 719 
E.  Epilogue: Disenchantment? ....................................................... 725 
F.  Running Themes in Landis’s Work ........................................... 729 
G.  The Administrative Process In Defense of Big Waiver? ........ 734 
1.  Which Landis? What Type of Expertise? ......................... 735 
2.  Naturalism for Our Age? .................................................... 736 
3.  The Fact/Theory Dichotomy .............................................. 740 
4.  “Law Must Be Made to Look Outside Itself” .................. 743 
5.  Accounting for Expertise .................................................... 745 
H.  The Administrative Process Paradigm(s) Revealed: 
  Conclusion .................................................................................. 748 
III.  THE JAFFE ALTERNATIVE: AN OVERTURE .................................... 751 
A.  Introduction to Jaffe .................................................................... 751 
B.  Snippets of Post-New Deal Jaffe  ............................................... 752 
C.  Conclusion: Jaffe in Defense of Big Waiver  ............................ 758 
IV.  CONCLUSION ........................................................................................ 759 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This Article is a rejoinder to the just-published, comprehensive, and 
impressive article, In Defense of Big Waiver.1  In that article, two 
 
1.  David J. Barron & Todd D. Rakoff, In Defense of Big Waiver, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 
265 (2013).  As illustrated by Professors Barron and Rakoff, big waiver provisions may take 
several forms.  In fact, they insightfully present “waiver power as a continuum,” id. at 278, 
that covers also “little waivers” (i.e., provisions that “delegate a limited power to handle the 
exceptional case . . . to merely ‘modify’ or ‘tinker’ with a statute through the lifting of limited 
aspects of a requirement contained within it in order to handle an unusual application”), id. at 
277.  Still, Barron and Rakoff maintain that those different forms of waiver belong “to a 
single family” because—and to the extent that—they share the displacement power, namely, 
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prominent administrative-law scholars, Professor David Barron and 
Professor Todd Rakoff, plead the cause of “big waiver” provisions that 
figure prominently in “the signature regulatory initiatives of the last two 
presidential administrations—the No Child Left Behind Act[2] of 
President George W. Bush and the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act[3] of President Barack Obama.”4  Big waiver statutory 
provisions “confer broad policymaking discretion so that the agency 
may choose to displace a regulatory baseline that Congress itself has 
established.”5  Barron and Rakoff base their support of big waiver on 
the seminal writing of James M. Landis.6  In response, this Article will 
argue that the theoretical foundation for big waiver offered by Barron 
and Rakoff is ill-founded.  The Article will develop instead a novel basis 
for justifying big waiver that draws on the work of Louis L. Jaffe.  In 
doing so, this Article advances a new reading of the writings of the two 
leading thinkers whose work has profoundly influenced the theory, 
jurisprudence, and operation of the administrative state in the last 
century.7 
Barron and Rakoff persuasively argue that in recent years big waiver 
has become a dominant feature of the American administrative state.8  
The two authors, who believe that big waiver is constitutionally 
 
the power to displace the regulatory baseline set by Congress.  Id. at 291.  This “family,” 
Barron and Rakoff emphasize, is to be set apart from administrative enforcement discretion, 
for while “waiver immunizes[,] non enforcement merely looks the other way.”  Id. at 274.  For 
further (and other) analytic descriptions of big waiver, see also id. at 290–91; Kate R. Bowers, 
Saying What the Law Isn’t: Legislative Delegation of Waiver Authority in Environment Laws, 
34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 257, 264–71 (2010); infra note 45 (describing big waiver’s 
“inversion” of traditional delegation).  
Indeed, it seems that waiver provisions are drawing more and more scholarly attention.  
For recent analyses of waiver, see also, for example, Samuel R. Bagenstos, Federalism by 
Waiver After the Health Care Case, in THE HEALTH CARE CASE: THE SUPREME COURT’S 
DECISION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 227 (Nathaniel Persily, Gilliam E. Metzger & Trevor W. 
Morrison eds., 2013), and the list of sources cited in Barron & Rakoff, supra, at 267 n.3. 
2.  Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002) (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 20 U.S.C.).  
3.  Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 26, 42 U.S.C.).  
4.  Barron & Rakoff, supra note 1, at 268.  For other examples of waiver provisions, see 
id. at 279–90.  For a short, useful history of big waiver, see Bagenstos, supra note 1, at 228–31. 
5.  Barron & Rakoff, supra note 1, at 291. 
6.  Id. at 267 n.2, 292. 
7.  See infra Parts II–III. 
8.  See also infra notes 33, 348 (explaining why big waiver is likely to figure even more 
prominently in the future). 
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warranted,9 spend a considerable amount of time on the 
“subconstitutional” level of analysis with a view to illustrating “how to 
reconcile big waiver and the administrative law doctrines and principles 
that have developed in the wake of the rise of the classic delegation.”10  
At this, as well as at many other key junctures, they take “classic”11 or 
“the traditional paradigm of delegation”12 as their stepping stone on the 
way to ascertaining that big waiver is lawful, justified, and desirable.  
Their analyses on these three levels of discussion—constitutionality,13 
legitimacy,14 and public policy15—start off on the assumption that 
 
9.  See Barron & Rakoff, supra note 1, at 312–18.  But see R. Craig Kitchen, Negative 
Lawmaking Delegations: Constitutional Structure and Delegations to the Executive of 
Discretionary Authority to Amend, Waive, and Cancel Statutory Text, 40 HASTINGS CONST. 
L.Q. 525 (2013).  As demonstrated by these sources, the two analytical frameworks that are 
most pertinent to testing the constitutionality of big waiver are the nondelegation doctrine 
and the bicameralism and presentment test.  See also Bowers, supra note 1, at 292–93, who 
highlights the fact that waiver arrangements may include limitations on judicial review and 
argues that the combination of such limitations with the delegation of powers that inheres in 
the waiver power “may well present constitutional problems.” 
10.  Barron & Rakoff, supra note 1, at 335; see also id. at 318–41. 
11.  Id. at 335; accord, e.g., id. at 295 (mentioning “classic delegations”). 
12.  Id. at 281; accord, e.g., id. at 270 (“the traditional form of delegation”). 
13.  For sources dealing with the constitutionality of big waiver, see supra note 9. 
14.  For an up-to-date discussion of the complex issue of the legitimacy of the 
administrative state, see Yair Sagy, A Triptych of Regulators: A New Perspective on the 
Administrative State, 44 AKRON L. REV. 425, 457–59 (2011) [hereinafter Sagy, Triptych of 
Regulators].  See also infra note 296 and accompanying text (arguing that—as applied to 
regulation—commonly, legitimacy concerns center on the exercise of discretionary state-
power by “politically unresponsive administrators”). 
It is well known that this issue has been a trademark of the American administrative 
state and the literature surrounding it.  As argued by Jody Freeman, “[A]dministrative law 
scholarship has organized itself largely around the need to defend the administrative state 
against accusations of illegitimacy.”  Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 
75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 546 (2000).  See also infra text accompanying note 297; David J. 
Arkush, Direct Republicanism in the Administrative Process, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1458, 
1460 (2013) (“Administrative law suffers from a prolonged sense of crisis regarding the 
legitimacy of regulatory action.”), and the contemporary controversy surrounding PHILIP 
HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? (2014), notably Adrian Vermeule, 
No—Review of Philip Hamburger, Is Administrative Law Unlawful?, TEX. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2014) (book review).  For recent comprehensive reviews of the legitimacy 
challenge and the means offered throughout the years to meet it, see, for example, Arkush, 
supra, at 1464–93; Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and 
Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461 (2003); David S. Rubenstein, 
“Relative Checks”: Towards Optimal Control of Administrative Power, 51 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 2169 (2010). 
15.  The policy aspects of big waiver are discussed in Barron & Rakoff, supra note 1, at 
292, 318, 332–39.  See, e.g., Bagenstos, supra note 1; Bowers, supra note 1, at 297–304. 
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“traditional delegation,” which is attributed to the New Deal,16 had 
already been properly established.17  Therefore, Barron and Rakoff take 
it as their only mission to incrementally push the analysis (only) one step 
further.  Standing on the shoulders of former jurists—actually, on the 
shoulders of one specific jurist in particular—they wish to explicate how 
arguments, which had proven successful in upholding “the classic New 
Deal type of regulation,”18 could now likewise defend big waiver.19 
This line of reasoning brings Barron and Rakoff, already at the 
outset of their discussion, to James Landis20 and his New Deal book, The 
Administrative Process.21  This is a natural, familiar move in the legal 
literature, which regards the New Deal as a critical juncture in the 
history, theory, and practice of the American administrative state, as the 
era during which a foundational—or “classic” as some would have it22—
paradigm of regulation was established.23  Typically, once this paradigm 
is included in the conversation, a string of classics ensues: the paradigm’s 
classic champion, the “New Deal architect,”24 James Landis;25 his book, 
The Administrative Process, acclaimed as “the most eloquent 
celebration of commission regulation ever written”;26 arguments made 
 
16.  Barron & Rakoff, supra note 1, at 266. 
17.  See id. at 292–312, 334–35. 
18.  Id. at 334.  
19.  See, e.g., id. at 340. 
20. See, e.g., id. at 269, 271, 287, 292–95, 300, 303, 310, 341. 
21.  JAMES LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (1938). 
22.  See supra text accompanying note 18. 
23.  The literature on the New Deal’s place in the history of American regulation is 
enormous.  See, for example, RONALD EDSFORTH, THE NEW DEAL: AMERICA’S RESPONSE 
TO THE GREAT DEPRESSION (2000), for a comprehensive survey of the different agencies 
that were established and the various governmental initiatives that were executed during the 
New Deal; see also Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. 
REV. 1189, 1243–53, 1262–63 (1986), for a powerful statement of the innovative message 
introduced by the New Deal to the realm of governmental regulation. 
24.  Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional 
Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 19 (2010); Jonathan H. Adler, Placing “Reins” on Regulations: 
Assessing the Proposed Reins Act, 16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 37 (2013) (“James 
Landis, who is often credited as the New Deal ‘architect’ of the modern administrative 
process, advocated extensive delegation of regulatory authority to administrative agencies.  
His arguments in support of delegation are commonly repeated to this day.”). 
25.  On Landis, see infra Parts II.A–B. 
26.  Thomas K. McCraw, Regulation in America: A Review Article, 49 BUS. HIST. REV. 
159, 162 (1975). 
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“in . . . classic form[s]” in the latter book in defense of “the classic form 
of delegation.”27 
Thus, like many others before them, Barron and Rakoff take this list 
of classics as their point of departure, and herein lies the rub.  For 
Barron and Rakoff surely mount an impressive construction, yet—as I 
wish to show in this Article—it is unsound.  Barron and Rakoff 
overlook the focal point in Landis’s The Administrative Process—the 
notion of administrative expertise.  This oversight not only results in an 
inaccurate portrayal of Landis’s work but also, as I will show below, 
weakens Barron and Rakoff’s enterprise.  Relying on Landis amounts to 
arguing that expertise is the only tenable basis for big waiver.28  
However, the two authors understandably sought to base their defense 
on a different theoretical foundation, as expertise had been widely 
discredited post-Landis.29 
Indeed, Barron and Rakoff’s project should be grounded in a 
different body of work.  Big waiver is both an important regulatory tool 
in its own right and a reflection of its era’s—this era’s—perceptions of 
regulation.  Since this is the case, there is certainly much to be gained 
from placing big waiver on an appropriate, solid footing, as the prospect 
of big waiver and other modern regulatory tools are at stake.  Badly 
conceived and inappropriately justified schemes of regulation simply do 
not stand a chance to succeed.  This is where Jaffe’s construction of a 
decentralized, interbranch dialogic theory of regulation will provide an 
alternative basis for big waiver.30  Jaffe, I will suggest, offers a vision of 
regulation much more in sync with the world of the twenty-first century 
than Landis.31  Consequently, it appears more appropriate to follow 
 
27.  Barron & Rakoff, supra note 1, at 267, 292. 
28.  See infra Part II.D.2. 
29.  Barron & Rakoff, supra note 1, at 271.  As Barron and Rakoff openly acknowledge, 
“[the] modern world . . . lacks [Landis’s] . . . faith in expertise.”  Id.; see infra note 298 
(discussing literature arguing the same). 
30.  See Infra Part III. 
31.  See Barron & Rakoff, supra note 1, at 293; Yair Sagy, The Manager, the Judge, and 
the Empiricist: American Administrative Law as a Theory of Expertise 308–43 (2006) 
(unpublished J.S.D. Dissertation, New York University) (on file with the New York 
University Law School Library) [hereinafter Sagy, The Manager, the Judge, and the 
Empiricist], available at http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1004&context=
yair_sagy, archived at http://perma.cc/P58R-5ARX. 
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Jaffe’s, rather than Landis’s, lead32 when analyzing the contemporary 
administrative apparatus. 
This Article, therefore, operates on three levels.  On one level, it is a 
response to Barron and Rakoff’s thought-provoking article on the big 
waiver era of the administrative state.  As thoroughly illustrated by 
Barron and Rakoff, big waiver merits our attention not only because it 
is a novel regulatory tool to be found in most recent central federal 
regulatory schemes, but also as its centrality and growing popularity is a 
testament to the rise of a new regulatory age in the United States.33  On 
a second level, the Article offers an in-depth, innovative analysis of the 
writings of two of the most influential thinkers on regulation: Landis and 
Jaffe.  In doing so, the Article questions the pervasive understanding of 
Landis’s work and promotes a novel reading of both Landis’s and Jaffe’s 
scholarship.  On yet a third level, this Article charts the contours of a 
new regulatory framework for the twenty-first century, which is rooted 
in Jaffe’s post-New Deal work. 
The Article proceeds as follows: The next Part (Part II) will 
introduce James Landis, survey his writing throughout his life, and 
critically analyze his magnum opus, The Administrative Process.  At 
several points in the discussion, the work of Louis Jaffe will be 
contrasted with that of Landis, thus foreshadowing the Article’s 
following Part (Part III), which will be dedicated to illustrating in what 
ways Jaffe’s scholarship may be of greater service to those seeking to 
advance the cause of big waiver.  Part IV will conclude. 
II. LANDIS AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 
A. Introduction: The New Deal’s Icon and Classic 
The fact that The Administrative Process (the book) and its author 
are the fulcrum around which Barron and Rakoff construct their 
 
32.  Cf. Barron & Rakoff, supra note 1, at 293 (conducting an analysis “[f]ollowing 
Landis’s lead”). 
33.  See id. at 293, 295.  Hence, according to Barron and Rakoff, it is the functional fit 
between “relatively permanent features” “of the contemporary political economy” and the 
big waiver technique that “give[s] reason to suspect big waivers will become an even more 
prominent feature of the administrative state in the years ahead.”  Id. at 293, 295.  Professor 
Bagenstos similarly argues that the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in National 
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012), is likely to “accelerate” 
the use of waiver.  Bagenstos, supra note 1, at 235 (“The NFIB case is therefore likely to 
accelerate the trend toward federalism by waiver.”).  For further reference to “federalism by 
waiver,” see infra notes 344–47 and accompanying text.  
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remarkable intellectual edifice may be easily explained.  Landis—called 
“Dean of Regulators” by his biographer34—is a celebrated figure in the 
history of American administrative law.  According to Thomas 
McCraw’s authoritative description, “[i]n the history of regulation in 
America, few names loom larger than that of James M. Landis.”35  And 
the book, which was published in 1938, was hailed as “the most eloquent 
celebration of commission regulation ever written.”36  Louis Jaffe said 
likewise that the book “espoused a paradigm of broad delegation which 
was the icon of the New Deal.”37  Hugely influential when published,38 
the book has long acquired the status of a classic.39  However, it has 
never been an antiquated, dusty classic but rather a source repeatedly 
referred to, from the day of its publication to these very days.40 
 
34.  DONALD A. RITCHIE, JAMES M. LANDIS: DEAN OF THE REGULATORS (1980). 
35.  THOMAS K. MCCRAW, PROPHETS OF REGULATION 153 (1984). 
36.  See McCraw, supra note 26, at 162. 
37.  Louis L. Jaffe, The Illusion of the Ideal Administration, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1183, 1186 
(1973) [hereinafter Jaffe, Illusion of Ideal Administration]. 
38.  For example, Jaffe wrote in the mid-1960s, “Landis spoke for all of us who had been 
deeply committed to the New Deal and who had been intimately associated with the 
administrative process.”  Louis L. Jaffe, James Landis and the Administrative Process, 78 
HARV. L. REV. 319, 320 (1964) [hereinafter Jaffe, James Landis].  The book, he added, 
“became inevitably a celebration, a defense, and a rationalization of the magnificent 
accomplishment in which [Landis] had played so brilliant a part.”  Id. at 320.  The bulk of the 
article, written almost thirty years after the book was published, nevertheless presents a 
critical assessment of the views expressed by Landis in the book, views that, as noted, Jaffe 
shared at the time.  See also A.H. Feller, The Quasi-Judicial, Quasi-Legislative Agencies, 27 
SURVEY GRAPHIC 620, 620 (1938) (reviewing LANDIS, supra note 21) (“Here are the words 
of one who is both scholar and administrator; a philosopher who has himself labored in the 
vineyard.”), and the following three reviews of Landis’s The Administrative Process: Thomas 
T. Cooke, Book Review, 48 YALE L.J. 925 (1939); George K. Gardner, Book Review, 52 
HARV. L. REV. 336 (1938); and George Nebolsine, Book Review, 48 YALE L.J. 929 (1939). 
39.  Barron & Rakoff, supra note 1, at 266–67.  Thus, for example, Barron and Rakoff 
refer to the book’s key formulations regarding American administrative law—the 
“archetypical form of delegation” of “highly discretionary regulatory power”—as “classic.”  
Id. 
40.  See, e.g., MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 
1870–1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 213–17 (1992); MCCRAW, supra note 35, at 
212–16; G. EDWARD WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL 114–16 (2000); 
Bruce A. Ackerman & William T. Hassler, Beyond the New Deal: Coal and the Clean Air Act, 
89 YALE L.J. 1466, 1471–72 (1980); James O. Freedman, Expertise and the Administrative 
Process, 28 ADMIN. L. REV. 363 (1976); Gerald E. Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in 
American Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1276, 1318–19 (1984); Michael Ray Harris, Breaking the 
Grip of the Administrative Triad: Agency Policy Making Under A Necessity-Based Doctrine, 
86 TUL. L. REV. 273, 283–84 (2011); Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. 
REV. 2245, 2261 (2001); Charles H. Koch, Jr., James Landis: The Administrative Process, 48 
ADMIN. L. REV. 419 (1996); Rubenstein, supra note 14, at 2185; Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic 
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Curiously enough, as voluminous as it is, the commentary to the 
book’s “meaning” seems to be of one mind.  It is commonly considered 
a piece of robust advocacy for the entrusting of expansive regulatory 
powers in the hands of administrative agencies in the name of a model 
of administrative expertise that is outlined in the book.41  On this 
reading of the book, agencies’ authority derives—again in Jaffe’s 
words—“from an assumed comprehensive body of expertise available 
for the implementation of legislative grants of authority.”42 
A book of this stature deserves—actually, it demands—to be 
critically revisited occasionally.  This is what I set out to do in this Part.  
Reexamining an entrenched interpretation of any book is a tall order.  It 
may also seem presumptuous or, worse still, superfluous.  After all, one 
may ask, is there anything new and interesting to say about it?  I think 
there is.  It seems to me that former readers took the book “at face 
value” and failed to notice its many layers and, even, inconsistencies.  
They have also often failed to examine the book against the backdrop of 
the whole of the Landis corpus, which stretched from the mid-1920s to 
the beginning of the 1960s.  As a correction, I will read the book with an 
eye on Landis’s contemporaneous, previous, and later contributions to 
the study of American constitutional order.  Such a comprehensive 
outlook is warranted, for it may highlight overarching themes running 
through the Landis corpus and may thus shed a new light on familiar 
aspects of the book. 
To be sure, the Part’s cross-generational analysis is not based on the 
(Talmudic) interpretive principle that “[t]here is no chronological order 
in the Torah,”43 and nowhere will it be argued that Landis’s various 
publications form one coherent body of literature (in this respect, my 
talk of “the Landis corpus” may be misleading).  Quite the contrary, as 
we shall see, with Landis there was “earlier” and “later.”  Nevertheless, 
there were also certain concerns that continuously troubled Landis 
throughout his life.44 
 
Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1511, 1513, 1518–19 
(1992); Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. 
REV. 1667, 1677–79 (1975); Mark Tushnet, Lecture, Administrative Law in the 1930s: The 
Supreme Court’s Accommodation to Progressive Legal Theory, 60 DUKE L.J. 1565, 1569–72 
(2011). 
41.  This characterization applies to all the many sources cited supra note 40.  
42.  Jaffe, Illusion of Ideal Administration, supra note 37, at 1187. 
43.  THE BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Pesahim 6b (Rabbi Dr. I. Epstein ed., Rabbi Dr. H. 
Freedman trans., spec. limited anniversary ed.) (1938) (emphasis added). 
44.  See infra Parts II.B, II.F. 
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My reading of the book will display two soft points in earlier 
readings of the book.  First, according to Barron and Rakoff, “The 
desire to overcome the dead hand of the past was a central impetus for 
the modern administrative process Landis championed.  Big waiver, 
[they] believe, is rooted in a similar impulse to make way for the new.”45  
This and similar formulations depict Landis’s (and the book’s) campaign 
with too-broad strokes.  What is missing from the picture is the entire 
book’s—if not Landis’s complete corpus’s—gravitational point: the 
concept of expertise.  Landis does indeed stand for broad delegation of 
power; however, he justifies it based on the idea of administrative 
expertise.46  Barron and Rakoff do make references to Landis’s belief in 
expertise,47 but the concept’s pivotal role in the construction of the 
book’s thesis is not adequately considered.  Thus, we get a dim portrayal 
of the administrative state, allegedly as conceived in the book, without 
its organizing principle.  No true depiction of the book can be had 
without heeding well this recurrent theme nor without its detailed 
analysis.  This is what I would like to do in this Part.  Specifically, this 
Part will expose several of the book’s abstruse intricacies in its 
treatment of administrative expertise.  It will bring out and assess the 
various components of the expertise model(s) propagated in the book.  
Significantly, this close reading of the book will unveil its unsettled, dual 
image of expertise.  This duality has largely gone unnoticed thus far. 
Second, Landis’s attempt to legitimize the administrative state on 
the basis of expertise was a failure.  The waning credibility of 
administrative expertise in the days following the New Deal has already 
been noted in the literature48 and obviously should be noted again in 
light of the current attempt to found big waiver on the iconic New Deal 
model of expert regulation.  This Part will further reveal that Landis’s 
model of expertise was flawed already at birth, as it were, and was hence 
destined to fail.  It will bring to light the book’s intricacies in 
constructing a coherent model, thus revealing its shaky foundations ab 
 
45.  Barron & Rakoff, supra note 1, at 271.  It should be noted, however, that Barron 
and Rakoff are careful to point out that waiver power is “akin to the Landis-like mode of big 
delegation, albeit in an inverted form.”  Id. at 278; cf., e.g., id. at 291, 295.  As they explain, 
“big waiver inverts” “the classic type of delegation” because big waiver is “[t]he delegation of 
the power to do the opposite of what the delegator [(i.e., Congress)] has itself done.”  Id. at 
269, 271. 
46.  Id. at 271.  
47.  Id. at 271, 294–95.  
48.  See supra note 29 and infra note 298.  
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initio.  It will further highlight the model’s naturalistic approach to 
regulation,49 thus exposing a major reason for its ultimate demise with 
the declining currency of naturalism in the course of the twentieth 
century.50  
It should be stated already here that these two points are the root 
causes of the Barron and Rakoff project’s untenability: not only is it 
founded on a cultural disposition that has fallen into disrepute 
(naturalism), but more fundamentally it relies on a (theoretically) 
flawed perception of administrative expertise.51 
In short, I will argue that Barron and Rakoff rely on Landis in their 
defense of big waiver, yet their description of Landis is seriously 
misplaced for it lacks the focal point of Landis’s book’s enterprise—the 
idea of administrative expertise.  Due to their oversight, incomplete 
portrayals of Landis and the book—again, the very foundations of 
Barron and Rakoff’s project—are produced.  This Part will first 
emphasize expertise’s centrality in The Administrative Process, thus 
providing a credible rendering of the book.  After providing such a 
perspective on the book, this Part will take a critical look at the notions 
of expertise lying at the book’s core and demonstrate how feeble they 
are. 
B. Landis’s Odyssey: Three-Part Saga 
This Part will sequentially follow Landis’s work.  The ensuing 
paragraphs, accordingly, nest in a rough chronological order.  As noted, 
the bulk of the discussion will revolve around the book, which is 
universally held to present the most lucid and thorough treatment of the 
concept of administrative expertise offered by an American legal 
scholar to this day.52  Moreover, as noted, this Part’s expansive 
 
49.  See infra Part II.G.2. 
50.  In other words, this Article does not base its arguments on a denial of the “actual,” 
or possible, existence of administrative expertise.  For literature directly debating the issue, 
see infra note 298.  This is not the question at bar.  Rather, the question is this: Whether 
basing the legitimacy of waiver provisions on a manuscript completely committed to the ideal 
of administrative expertise makes sense, given the scathing criticism leveled at the ideal over 
the years and in light of the inadequate defense provided for this ideal in the specific 
manuscript at hand?  See Koch, supra note 40.  The Article’s answer is in the negative.   
51.  As a final clarification, this Part, generally, will limit its treatment of constitutional 
issues relating to big waiver—or, more broadly, to regulation—to a minimum.  See supra note 
9.  Its focal point is, in a word, the foundational question of the legitimacy of regulation.  See 
supra note 14. 
52.  See supra notes 36–38 and accompanying text. 
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commentary will expose some of Landis’s overlooked inconsistencies 
but also themes running through his manifold corpus of literature.  I will 
demonstrate that, turbulent as his history and that of the regulatory 
machinery were, Landis remained throughout his torturous scholarly 
journey a devout believer in the great potentials of the regulatory 
endeavor.53 
Who was, then, James McCauley Landis, and how did he come to 
gain such a mythological stature in the annals of American regulation?  
Born in 1899, Landis graduated from Harvard Law School as an 
outstanding student already at the age of twenty-five and went to clerk 
for Justice Brandeis.  Having assumed professorship at his alma mater, 
he was appointed at the tender age of thirty-eight as the youngest dean 
in Harvard Law School’s history.54  While at Harvard and later on, he 
acquired an extensive experience as a regulator.55  Landis served as a 
commissioner in three agencies: first at the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC) and later at the SEC.56  In 1935, he became the SEC Chairman.57  
 
53.  See infra Part II.F. 
54.  For Landis’s biography, see MCCRAW, supra note 35, 153–209; RITCHIE, supra note 
34, at 79; Koch, supra note 40. 
55.  Indeed, it may be suggested that it was Landis’s own experience as a commissioner 
that inspired his great faith in the potential contribution of an agency’s competent staff to the 
administrative process.  See LANDIS, supra note 21, at 68.  In the first year after its 
establishment, the staff of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) had to deal with 
incredible workload, as so many corporations and exchanges had to be registered for the first 
time.  Thus, according to Landis, everybody—the commissioners and their able staff, 
accountants, and statisticians—worked very hard, all infused with a shared spirit of common 
mission.  Landis was very impressed by his staff; he said there were 
very able people in there . . . .  Some of them worked around the clock in order to 
meet the deadline, which they did.  But that was the kind of aura and atmosphere 
under which people worked.  There was no question about hours or anything of that 
nature.  There was a tremendous enthusiasm to see that these pieces of legislation 
would work, and would work to the benefit of the financial community as well as 
everybody else. 
MCCRAW, supra note 35, at 184 (quoting THE REMINISCENCES OF JAMES M. LANDIS 225 
(1964) (Interview by Neil Gold, Oral History Research Office, Columbia University, with 
James M. Landis, in Harrison, New York (1963–1964)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
Landis makes explicit references at various points in the book to his experience as an 
administrator.  See, for example, LANDIS, supra note 21, at 68, 75; see also Tushnet, supra 
note 40, at 1602–13, relating the controversy surrounding Jones v. Securities and Exchange 
Commission, 298 U.S. 1 (1936), in which Landis was implicated as an SEC Commissioner and 
following which Landis—adverting to Justice Sutherland’s opinion in Jones—commented, 
“Such an outburst indicates that one is in the field where calm judicial temper has fled,” 
LANDIS, supra note 21, at 139. 
56.  RITCHIE, supra note 34, at 74. 
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(Later on, in 1946 he was named the chairman of the Civil Aeronautics 
Board (CAB).)58  Landis is also remembered for his role during the New 
Deal, when he, along with Benjamin Cohen and Thomas Corcoran,59 
played a pivotal role in the drafting of the two keystones of federal 
securities legislation, the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, as well as in the preparation of the highly 
contested Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935.60 
Landis’s career as a scholar can be divided into the following three 
(somewhat overlapping) periods:  
1. At the inception of Landis’s career, his main interests lay in the 
study of “how business comes to the Court and the manner of its 
disposition”61 and in the analytical study of legislation.62  Having been 
named the first Professor of Legislation at Harvard Law School,63 
Landis made it his business to reprimand the legal profession in general, 
but courts in particular, for ignoring legislation and limiting its interest 
to the study of (judge-made) common law.64  Further, Landis’s early 
work advocated courts’ deference to Congress.  “Essential to the proper 
scope of judicial review over legislation,” he wrote in 1931, “is a sense of 
respect for the legislature’s conclusions.”65 
2. Starting in the mid-1930s until his death in 1964, Landis focused 
his attention more directly on issues of administrative regulation.  
Elaborating on his previous, often sarcastic, assessment of the role 
played by courts in frustrating progressive legislative intent,66  Landis 
 
57.  Id. at 68.  On Landis’s chairmanship of the SEC, see id. at 68–78. 
58.  Id. at 140.  Landis served on the CAB from June 1946 to December 1947, when 
Truman declined to renew his appointment.  When the two men met, President Truman told 
Landis that when he became President he had been told, “‘[Y]ou’ll have to be a son-of-a-
bitch half the time.’  This is one of the times,” Truman said.  Id. at 153 (internal quotation 
mark omitted). 
59.  On these and other New Deal lawyers, see, for example, PETER H. IRONS, THE 
NEW DEAL LAWYERS (1982), and WILLIAM LASSER, BENJAMIN V. COHEN: ARCHITECT OF 
THE NEW DEAL (2002). 
60.  On the drafting of these three Acts, see LASSER, supra note 59, at 65–129; 
MCCRAW, supra note 35, at 153–209; RITCHIE, supra note 34, at 43–61.  
61.  Felix Frankfurter & James M. Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court at October 
Term, 1930, 45 HARV. L. REV. 271, 271 (1931). 
62.  Id. at 271. 
63.  RITCHIE, supra note 34, at 35. 
64.  James M. Landis, The Study of Legislation in Law Schools, 39 HARV. GRADUATES’ 
MAG. 433, 441 (1931) [hereinafter Landis, The Study of Legislation in Law Schools].  
65.  Id. 
66.  See infra text accompanying notes 79, 89.  
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carried over the analysis to a more general level by conducting a 
comparative institutional study67 in which he critically examined the 
(in)adequacy of the three “constitutional” branches of government to 
constructively regulate the modern economy.  This study led him to 
underscore the necessity of entrusting wide discretion in the hands of 
administrative agencies.  He concluded that in many incidents the 
judiciary, in particular, should pull out and let expert agencies do their 
jobs.68  The exact ingredients of this “expertise” will be parsed out 
below.69  It was during this period of his life that Landis produced his 
most influential and everlasting contribution to the theory of 
administrative regulation: his 1938 book, The Administrative Process, 
which contains Landis’s Strorrs Lectures at Yale Law School.70  A close 
reading of it will stand, therefore, at the center of this Part.  
3. Finally, in the “Landis Report”71—composed in 1960 at the 
request of a son of a friend, President-elect Kennedy, to whom he had 
been “something of an honorary uncle” for many years72—Landis took 
a retrospective look at the administrative apparatus as it had come to 
pass since the New Deal.73  Much less exuberant and buoyant in spirit 
than the book, the Report pillories many predicaments that afflicted 
federal agencies in the preceding decades and calls for agencies’ 
deference to the Executive.74 
C. Prologue: On the Business of the Court and Legislation 
Beginning in 1924, the year of his graduation from Harvard Law 
School, Landis introduced himself to the legal community through a 
series of articles that focused on two topics: (1) a study of the mechanics 
 
67.  For the theoretical contextualization of Landis’s institutional competence analysis, 
see Jeffrey Rudd, The Evolution of the Legal Process School’s “Institutional Competence” 
Theme: Unintended Consequences for Environmental Law, 33 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1045, 1055 
(2006) (“The Great Depression sparked the institutional competence idea as part of a 
broader theoretical movement to constrain industrial monopolists from disrupting social 
order and threatening democratic principles of self-governance.”).   
68.  See infra Part II.D.2. 
69.  See infra Part II.G. 
70.  The lectures took place in January 1938.  See RITCHIE, supra note 34, at 84–86. 
71.  JAMES M LANDIS, REPORT ON REGULATORY AGENCIES TO THE PRESIDENT-
ELECT (1960) [hereinafter THE LANDIS REPORT]. 
72.  RITCHIE, supra note 34, at 168.  Landis was a close friend of the Kennedys and 
remained in close contact with Joseph P. Kennedy throughout his life.  See id.  At some point, 
Landis even worked for “Joe Senior.”  See id. at 158–59. 
73.  See infra Part II.E. 
74.  RITCHIE, supra note 34, at 177–78. 
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of the federal judiciary, which he conducted with Felix Frankfurter,75 
and (2) the tension between the common law tradition and modern 
legislation.76 
This literature introduces two emphases to the present investigation.  
First, it bears testimony to Landis’s long-standing understanding that 
this was an era of sea change in the economic and political history of the 
United States.  He realized that a series of profound historical processes 
had ushered in a new era, which called for a radical change in the way 
lawyers think of social changes, government’s role, and, ultimately, law 
itself.77  Second, contemporary courts, led by the Supreme Court, came 
to symbolize for Landis reactionary forces in the American polity.78  To 
him, courts’ “conservative tendencies” had first to be eradicated for the 
law “to cope adequately with the problems raised by a rapidly changing 
civilization.”79  By naming several traits embedded in the common law 
tradition that impede any substantial progress on this front, Landis 
prefigured future institutional analyses, which he would bring to center 
stage later on in his writing.80 
 
75.  The two already published in May 1925 an article dealing with mechanisms to 
alleviate problems of coordination among the legal regimes of the several states (particularly, 
“the Compact Clause” of the Constitution, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3).  See Felix 
Frankfurter & James M. Landis, The Compact Clause of the Constitution—A Study in 
Interstate Adjustments, 34 YALE L.J. 685 (1925).  The most notable product of their joint 
venture was the book, FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES M. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE 
SUPREME COURT: A STUDY IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM (1928).  The book’s eight 
articles had been individually presented in the Harvard Law Review, beginning in June 1925.  
See Felix Frankfurter & James M. Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court of the United 
States—A Study in the Federal Judicial System (pts. 1, 6–8), 38 HARV. L. REV. 1005 (1925), 40 
HARV. L. REV. 431, 834, 1110 (1927); Felix Frankfurter, The Business of the Supreme Court of 
the United States—A Study in the Federal Judicial System (pts. 2–5), 39 HARV. L. REV. 35, 
325, 587, 1046 (1925–1926).  Half of the articles are presented as Frankfurter’s alone (the 
second, third, fourth, and fifth), since “Landis’s position with Brandeis prevented his name as 
appearing as co-author.”  RITCHIE, supra note 34, at 25.  See also Frankfurter & Landis, supra 
note 61; Felix Frankfurter & James M. Landis, The Supreme Court Under the Judiciary Act of 
1925, 42 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1928). 
76.  See, e.g., James McCauley Landis, Statutes and the Sources of Law, 2 HARV. J. ON 
LEGIS. 7 (1965) [hereinafter Landis, Statutes and the Sources of Law].  The article was original 
published in 1934 as James McCauley Landis, Statutes and the Sources of Law, in HARVARD 
LEGAL ESSAYS WRITTEN IN HONOR OF AND PRESENTED TO JOSEPH HENRY BEALE AND 
SAMUEL WILLISTON 213 (1934). 
77.  See infra text accompanying notes 85–88.  
78.  LANDIS, supra note 21, at 33–36.  Clearly, Landis was not unique in holding this 
view.  See, e.g., Reuel E. Schiller, Enlarging the Administrative Polity: Administrative Law and 
the Changing Definition of Pluralism, 1945–1970, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1389, 1403–05 (2000). 
79.  Landis, The Study of Legislation in Law Schools, supra note 64, at 435. 
80.  See infra Part II.D.2. 
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As a young scholar, Landis (writing alone) drummed home the 
message that legislation as lawyers had known it in the past had gone 
through a transformation in recent history.81  So much so, he was sure, 
that the advent of this new phase in the history of legislation warranted 
a reconfiguration of the extant body of law so that legislation’s primacy 
as a legal source would be acknowledged and acted upon.82  While 
preaching to law school professors, too,83 his target audience was the 
Supreme Court. 
Legislation has much advanced in recent times, Landis claimed in 
one essay.  It “represent[s] a wide[] and . . . comprehensive grasp of the 
situation.”84  It is better drafted than in the past, more systematic, 
handled by expert draftsmen, and attuned to pending social needs.85  
Furthermore, democratic legislation does not suffer from legitimacy 
deficit86 and is better informed than common law judges who 
customarily draw on “an outmoded age or a narrower experience.”87  As 
such, lawyers and courts have much to learn from it, rather than 
stubbornly adhere to the view that “the statute . . . [is] merely . . . the 
voice of a majority, and seemingly only as durable as that majority.  It 
simply states its commands and pleas no reason for its cause.”88 
Already at this stage of his academic career, Landis believed that the 
courts’ role in industry regulation should be carefully demarcated due to 
their judicial imperialism and “barbaric rules of interpretation”;89 they 
must learn to heed well the intent of the Legislature when interpreting 
the regulations; and in any event they should be deferential to 
 
81.  Landis, Statutes and the Sources of Law, note 76, at 13. 
82.  Id. at 12–13. 
83.  See Landis, The Study of Legislation in Law Schools, supra note 64, at 433.  
84.  Landis, Statutes and the Sources of Law, note 76, at 14. 
85.  Id. at 13.  On this article’s place in the long-standing debate about the interplay 
between the common law and statutes, see Alexandra B. Klass, Common Law and Federalism 
in the Age of Regulatory State, 92 IOWA L. REV. 545, 548–57 (2007).  
86.  I will return to this subject below, of course.  See infra notes 205, 296 and 
accompanying text. 
87.  Landis, The Study of Legislation in Law Schools, supra note 64, at 437; see also id. at 
436; infra note 110 (Landis’s listing courts’ inadequacies as regulators). 
88.  Landis, The Study of Legislation in Law Schools, supra note 64, at 433 (arguing that, 
in so doing, lawyers and judges ignored the important role legislation had played in the 
development of the common law); see also Landis, Statutes and the Sources of Law, supra 
note 76, at 8 (“[M]uch of what is ordinarily regarded as ‘common law’ finds its source in 
legislative enactment.”). 
89.  James M. Landis, A Note on “Statutory Interpretation,” 43 HARV. L. REV. 886, 890 
(1930). 
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Congress.90  In a 1924 piece, which he co-authored with Frankfurter, the 
writers told the Supreme Court that (a) in handling the issue of 
separation of powers, “[i]t is futile to draw the answer from abstract 
speculation”;91 and (b) Congress is “that branch of the government upon 
which is cast the primary responsibility for adjusting public affairs.”92 
Now, we turn to the book. 
D. Landis and The Administrative Process 
1. Some Context  
Landis’s main intent in authoring the book seems evident: he wished 
to present a lucid, coherent, and unrepentant justification for the 
burgeoning agencies, those always-contested governmental devices, 
which were enthusiastically used by the New Dealers.93  Importantly, he 
did so in the face of a hostile environment. 
“[T]hose who hailed” regulation by agencies and “those who hated 
it”94 were engaged in an extensive, convoluted, and sometimes 
acrimonious intellectual brawl, which was wide-ranging and long-
lasting.95  While it had already reached a noticeable climax during the 
Progressive Era, by the New Deal, new records were broken.96  With the 
advent of the New Deal, three fairly distinct coalitions took part in the 
 
90.  Id. (“[S]trong judges prefer to override the intent of the legislature in order to make 
law according to their own views . . . .”). 
91.  Felix Frankfurter & James M. Landis, Power of Congress Over Procedure in 
Criminal Contempts in “Inferior” Federal Courts—A Study in Separation of Powers, 37 
HARV. L. REV. 1010, 1018 (1924). 
92.  Id. at 1016. 
93.  See supra note 23. 
94.  Louis L. Jaffe, The Effective Limits of the Administrative Process: A Reevaluation, 67 
HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1105 (1954) [hereinafter Jaffe, A Reevaluation]. 
95.  On the commotion that the delegation of administrative discretion to agencies 
stirred, see also LANDIS, supra note 21, at 2, 49–52, 92; RITCHIE, supra note 34, 43–78; 
MCCRAW, supra note 35, 210–21; G. EDWARD WHITE, supra note 40, 94–127; George B. 
Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges from New Deal 
Politics, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1557 (1996); Sagy, The Manager, the Judge, and the Empiricist, 
supra note 31, ch. 90–123. 
96.  See generally RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM: FROM BRYAN TO 
F.D.R. (1955); MICHAEL MCGERR, A FIERCE DISCONTENT: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE 
PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1870–1920 (2003); ROBERT H. WIEBE, 
BUSINESSMEN AND REFORM: A STUDY OF THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT (1962); Yair 
Sagy, The Legacy of Social Darwinism: From Railroads to the “Reinvention” of Regulation, 11 
GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 481 (2013) [hereinafter Sagy, The Legacy of Social Darwinism]; 
Tushnet, supra note 40. 
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discussion.  First, there was a party headed by pro-commission lawyers, 
some of whom lent a hand in the design of major pieces of legislation 
advanced by the FDR administration; these were the panegyrics of the 
administrative state—dominant members included Landis, Thomas 
Corcoran, and Benjamin Cohen.97  The second group was a coalition of 
anti-commission thinkers, led by conservative lawyers and coordinated 
by the American Bar Association, such as Arthur Vanderbilt, its 
president during the years 1937–1938; Louis Caldwell, who was the first 
chairman of the Special Committee on Administrative Law of the ABA 
(established in 1933);98 and the eminent Roscoe Pound, who had a stint 
as one of Caldwell’s successors as chairman of the Special Committee.99  
The last camp consisted of scholars outside the legal academy, led by 
political scientists, such as the members of the President’s Committee on 
Administrative Management (“the President’s Committee”), which 
famously wrote of the administrative arm of government in its 1937 
report, “Without plan or intent, there has grown up a headless ‘fourth 
branch’ of the Government . . . .”100 
 
97.  See supra notes 59–60 and accompanying text. 
98.  See Louis G. Caldwell, A Federal Administrative Court, 84 U. PA. L. REV. 966 
(1936). 
99.  In that capacity, Pound was responsible for the famous “Pound Report.”  Roscoe, 
Pound, Report of the Special Committee on Administrative Law, 63 REP. AM. B. ASS’N 331 
(1938) [hereinafter Pound Report]; see also Tushnet, supra note 40, at 1629–31 (relating the 
Special Committee’s story). 
100.  THE PRESIDENT’S COMM. ON ADMIN. MGMT., ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT 
IN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES 30 (1937) [hereinafter THE PRESIDENT’S 
COMMITTEE REPORT].  For later uses of similar language, see FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 
470, 487 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“[The administrative bodies] have become a 
veritable fourth branch of the Government . . . .”); Rubenstein, supra note 14, at 2215 
(referring to the administrative state as “a hydra-headed fourth player ”).  
The three members of the President’s Committee were Luther Gulick, who was one of 
the heads of the Institute of Public Administration, established in New York in 1921; Charles 
Merriam, at one point the president of the American Political Science Association; and Louis 
Brownlow, a former city manager of Petersburg, Virginia.  For the biography of the three 
members of the President’s Committee, see BARRY DEAN KARL, EXECUTIVE 
REORGANIZATION AND REFORM IN THE NEW DEAL: THE GENESIS OF ADMINISTRATIVE 
MANAGEMENT 1900–1939 (1963).  
Generally, in its report, the Committee proposed a highly centralistic reorganization plan 
whereby the President, in person or through his executive office, would effectively command 
the whole federal administrative apparatus—independent agencies included, see infra note 
121—and all parts of the Executive.  Compare contemporary arguments put forward in 
support of the Presidential-Control Model.  See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. 
Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 581 (1994) 
(“Congress . . . may not create inferior entities that will be constitutionally empowered to 
exercise the executive power without the acquiescence of the President.  Once created, these 
 
 2014] A BETTER DEFENSE OF BIG WAIVER 715 
Landis, for his part, heaped criticism on his opponents’ head.  He 
maintained in the book that unless a functional (rather than “formal”) 
reading of the Constitution is accepted, one which validates the 
administrative endeavor, the federal government will not be able to 
perform its multifaceted duties, the list of which has substantially 
increased since the advent of the industrial age and the unprecedented 
challenges it had introduced.101  I will not dwell on Landis’s 
constitutional discussion.  Suffice it to say that his solution to the 
pending constitutional inquiry rests on the claim that the agency is 
subjected in its operation to the command of the three branches of 
government; thus, these three have a share in keeping it within 
acceptable boundaries.102  Accordingly, in the book the principle of 
separation of powers is satisfied in the combined supervision of the 
agencies.103 
2. And Expertise to All 
Once the need for a flexible interpretation of the American 
constitutional jurisprudence is acknowledged and (in Landis’s view) 
met, Landis moves to present a criterion for distributing the diverse 
governmental duties among the various branches—the Legislative, 
Executive, Judicial, and administrative—while advocating the 
delegation of broad powers to the administrative in the appropriate 
cases.104  Here enters the concept of relative institutional competence, 
namely, of expertise.  The boldness of this thrust should be underlined.  
Landis seems to be all but positive that he is able to provide a sufficient 
justification for the erection of a mammoth administrative apparatus—
not at all a trifling matter, given his formidable opponents.105  But it goes 
 
agencies . . . must . . . be subject to Presidential superintendence . . . .”); see also Steven G. 
Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive, 48 ARK. L. REV. 23 (1995); 
Kagan, supra note 40; Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make 
Political Decisions, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81 (1985); Rubenstein, supra note 14, at 2200–04.  
For counterarguments, see, for example, Cynthia R. Farina, Undoing the New Deal Through 
the New Presidentialism, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 227 (1998). 
101.  See supra text accompanying note 79 (referring to a “rapidly changing civilization” 
(internal quotation mark omitted) (quoting Landis, The Study of Legislation in Law Schools, 
supra note 64, at 435)). 
102.  For contemporary support in this approach, see Rubenstein, supra note 14, at 
2213–14. 
103.  LANDIS, supra note 21, at 46, 60, 111. 
104.  See id., at 66–70, 75.  
105.  See supra Part II.D.1. 
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further than that, as Landis treats the administrative agencies as equal to 
the three “constitutional” branches when he examines the relative 
advantages and disadvantages of each branch in serving the public 
good.106  This leads him to conclude that in many incidents the judiciary, 
in particular, should pull out and let the agencies do their job—they are 
simply better equipped to do it, as it is in their expertise.107  What exactly 
are the ingredients of this “expertise” will be examined below, yet it 
should be emphasized that a notion of expertise not only affords the 
animating spirit of the administration but also provides the dividing line 
between the administrative branch and the other branches of 
government.108  In other words, it gives life to all of them—each one and 
its own field of expertise.  “[F]rom the standpoint of affording 
conceptions of liberty real meaning,” says Landis, “one can ask little 
more than to have issues decided by those best equipped for the task.”109 
Landis’s discussion of the merits and flaws of the judiciary in this 
context is by far the most elaborate.  He takes great pains to name all 
the many deficiencies of the judicial process in providing a satisfactory 
response to contemporary regulatory requirements.110  Particularly 
important for our purpose is Landis’s following observation:  
A general jurisdiction leaves the resolution of an infinite variety 
of matters within the hands of courts.  In the disposition of these 
claims judges are uninhibited in their discretion except for 
legislative rules of guidance or such other rules as they 
themselves may distill out of that vast reserve of materials that 
 
106.  See also supra note 67 (describing the theoretical foundations of Landis’s 
institutional analysis) and infra note 118 (citing a contemporary example of such analysis).  
Compare the analysis conducted in Rubenstein, supra note 14.  
107.  See infra notes 110–11 and accompanying text. 
108.  Sagy, The Manager, the Judge, and the Empiricist, supra note 31, at 201. 
109.  LANDIS, supra note 21, at 153. 
110.  Id. at 33–36.  Landis provides here a lengthy litany, as he enumerates many 
predicaments that are related to the option of regulation by the courts (and not by the 
administration).  He asserts that the courts’ process is not well suited for the maintenance of 
supervision over a pending issue for the long haul, id. at 30; as there are many judicial 
instances, it is difficult to achieve a final unified legal rule that governs a particular question, 
id. at 33, 134; the judicial process is largely in the hands of the interested parties, id. at 34–36; 
legal proceedings are often lengthy and expensive, id. at 33; and judicial remedies cannot 
meet the demands of the regulatory enterprise, id. at 89.  For a review of comparable 
contemporary analyses, which generally go along the same lines, see Rubenstein, supra note 
14, at 2190–99.  But see Cooke, supra note 38, at 928 (replying to Landis’s call for a more 
efficient resolution of controversies than the one offered by courts) (“[T]he rise of democracy 
has resulted, to a greater or less degree, in the doing away with . . . summary and arbitrary 
methods.”). 
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we call the common law.  This breadth of jurisdiction and 
freedom of disposition tends somewhat to make judges jacks-of-
all-trades and masters of none.111 
What is, then, the role assigned by Landis to courts in the overall 
management of the state?  Landis unequivocally stipulates here again 
the pervasiveness and determinacy of the category of expertise in his 
proposed scheme.  Yet again, expertise is the yardstick, even—as we 
shall now see—in his definition of “law.”  
Law, for Landis, is the realm of the judiciary.112  Landis has a 
seemingly simple definition of the relationship between “law” and 
“courts”: what judges ought to do—“ought” as derived from Landis’s 
methodology of comparative competence—is law.113 
Thus viewed, the duties that the other branches of government are 
less capable of performing are in the province of the courts and are 
hence regarded as “law.”  Landis emphatically declares:  
Our desire to have courts determine questions of law is related to a 
belief in their possession of expertness with regard to such 
questions.  It is from that very desire that the nature of questions of 
 
111.  LANDIS, supra note 21, at 31.  Landis goes on to argue that the reasons for 
entrusting “an extended police function of a particular nature” in the hands of agencies “[i]n 
large measure . . . sprang from a distrust of the ability of the judicial process to make the 
necessary adjustments in the development of both law and regulatory methods as they related 
to particular industrial problems.”  Id. at 30. 
For similar arguments made in later years, see, for example, 1 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 1.05 (1958) (arguing that courts (and Congress) are “ill-
suited for handling masses of detail, or for applying to shifting and continuing problems the 
ideas supplied by scientists or other professional advisers”); Michael Asimow, The Scope of 
Judicial Review of Decisions of California Administrative Agencies, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1157, 
1195 (1995) (“[A]gencies have developed the sort of expertise and technical knowledge that 
gives them a comparative advantage in interpreting such texts over a generalist court that 
lacks such qualifications.”); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Marbury: The Executive’s Power to Say 
What the Law Is, 115 YALE L.J. 2580, 2583 (2006) (“For the resolution of ambiguities in 
statutory law, technical expertise and political accountability are highly relevant, and on these 
counts the executive has significant advantages over courts.  Changed circumstances, 
involving new values and new understandings of fact, are relevant too, and they suggest 
further advantages on the part of the executive.”). 
112.  For more current similar views, see, for example, David S. Law, A Theory of 
Judicial Power and Judicial Review, 97 GEO. L.J. 723, 748 (2009) (“Courts are . . . specialists 
and experts in the interpretation and application of law.”); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Costs and 
Benefits of Aggressive Judicial Review of Agency Action, 1989 DUKE L.J. 522, 523 (“[C]ourts 
have a comparative advantage over agencies in deciding what the law is.”). 
113.  Sagy, The Manager, the Judge, and the Empiricist, supra note 31, at 242. 
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law emerges.  For, in the last analysis, they seem to me to be those 
questions that lawyers are equipped to decide.114 
Congress, likewise, has a particular role in Landis’s scheme.  It 
should be the arena where—to use a term famously invoked by Justice 
Scalia in Romer v. Evans—Kulturkampf takes place.115  That is, the 
Legislature’s function is to process “those postulates [that] have . . . 
enlisted the loyalties and faiths of classes of people.”116  It should first 
intercept the popular will and then synthesize and translate it into a 
coherent legislative edict, thus pointing the agencies to a certain 
direction but leaving the latter to devise a detailed road map.117  By so 
doing, Congress confers on the ensuing administrative action “that 
finality and moral sanction necessary for enforcement.”118 
 
114.  LANDIS, supra note 21, at 152.  Accordingly, Landis chides courts for overstepping 
their sphere of expertise in passing upon the constitutionality of administrative decisions.  See, 
e.g., infra text accompanying note 197.  Note, however, that later in the book Landis also 
maintains that courts are “experts in the synthesis of design.”  LANDIS, supra note 21, at 
154−55. 
115.  Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  Indeed, it appears 
that Landis tries to put forward a viable boundary to Congress’s sphere of operation, which 
would replace the Court’s jurisprudence of his time without discarding the nondelegation 
doctrine altogether.  In this regard my reading of Landis’s approach to the Schechter doctrine 
is different from that of Morton Horwitz.  In A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 
295 U.S. 495 (1935), the Court struck down the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 
(NIRA), as it provided for an unconstitutional delegation of legislative powers from Congress 
to an administrative agency.  Whereas Horwitz maintains that “[a]n important part of The 
Administrative Process was devoted to attacking the delegation theory,” HORWITZ, supra 
note 40, at 217, I believe that the book was attacking only the way the doctrine was 
implemented by the Court.  Actually, on my reading, the doctrine, properly applied, played an 
important role in the constitutional Landisian scheme.  See James M. Landis, Crucial Issues in 
Administrative Law, 53 HARV. L. REV. 1077, 1102 (1940) (“[I]n Schechter Poultry Corp. v. 
United States, the Supreme Court . . . expunged from the statute book an act that was bound 
to fail of its high purpose because behind it was none of that understanding essential to the 
effectiveness of reform.”); infra text accompanying note 195 (discussing Landis’s outlook on 
courts’ institutional role vis-à-vis the other branches of government). 
116.  LANDIS, supra note 21, at 59. 
117.  Adolph Berle nicely captured this idea when he wrote in 1917 that when “the 
function of the general body—Congress—stopped, . . . that of the special body—the 
commission—began.”  A.A. Berle, Jr., The Expansion of American Administrative Law, 30 
HARV. L. REV. 430, 439 (1917). 
118.  LANDIS, supra note 21, at 60.  A similar position with regard to Congress was taken 
in the course of the debate following Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).  There, the argument 
was applied with regard to the division of labor between Congress and the courts.  See 
Elizabeth Garrett, Institutional Lessons from the 2000 Presidential Election, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 975, 975 (2001) (“[T]he Bush–Gore election concretely illustrates that institutional 
design is a crucial consideration in determining which part of the government is best suited to 
render particular decisions.  When institutions must become involved in majoritarian political 
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Lastly, the book also implies that the function of the other political 
branch, the Executive, qua political branch, is to focus on solving 
questions of high politics with executorial tools.119  It is not to be 
confused with the administrative branch.120  The Executive is a political 
branch while the administrative is a policy branch.121  (I will return to the 
politics/policy dichotomy.)122 
Having reviewed the comparative expertise of each branch of 
government, Landis provides a detailed description of the 
administrative branch’s expertise. 
3. A Duet of Expertise Types 
This Section has one major finding, which cuts against the book’s 
common interpretation.  The finding is this: Landis espouses more than 
one type of administrative expertise in the book.  As will now be 
disclosed, the book embraces two paradigms of expertise.  Thus, while 
my reading of the book may deepen our understanding of administrative 
expertise (or assertions thereof), it will surely call into question the 
coherence of the concept, at least as it is presented by its great advocate. 
 
decisions such as the selection of a President, it may be better to rely largely on the political 
branches than on the judiciary . . . .  This allocation of decisionmaking authority is preferable 
because of the greater democratic credentials of Congress.”). 
119.  Sagy, The Manager, the Judge, and the Empiricist, supra note 31, at 247–48. 
120.  LANDIS, supra note 21, at 15 (“[I]t is obvious that the resort to the administrative 
process is not, as some suppose, simply an extension of executive power.”). 
121.  Thus, for example, when championing the independent agency (i.e., an agency, like 
the FTC and the SEC, whose head the President cannot remove without cause, see, e.g., 
Barkow, supra note 24, at 16–17), Landis explains why it is important to maintain a dividing 
line between the executive and the administrative:  
The reasons for favoring this form seem simple enough—a desire to have the 
fashioning of industrial policy removed to a degree from political influence.  At the 
same time, there seems to have been a hope that the independent agency would 
make for more professionalism than that which characterized the normal executive 
department. 
LANDIS, supra note 21, at 111. 
122.  See infra Part II.G.4.  According to Landis’s approach, the prototypical executive 
activity seems to be the handling of foreign and security affairs; allocation of funds by the 
treasury is also an appropriate example.  It seems that Section 553(a) of the Administrative 
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(a) (2012), which is dedicated to “Rule making,” is based on a 
similar rationale.  It provides that “[t]his section applies, according to the provisions thereof, 
except to the extent that there is involved—(1) a military or foreign affairs function of the 
United States; or (2) a matter relating to agency management or personnel or to public 
property, loans, grants, benefits, or contracts.”  Id. 
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It turns out that Landis was not exceptional in propagating more 
than one paradigm of expertise.  Rather, in so doing, he was falling in 
line with a distinct pattern that cuts across the legal and non-legal 
American literature dedicated to the administrative state in the United 
States from the late nineteenth century to this day.  As I have illustrated 
elsewhere,123 from a bird’s-eye-view on that expansive literature, one 
can detect three types of regulators, each with its own unique expertise, 
which are embedded in it.  I have named them “the Guardian,” which 
corresponds to Landis’s description of the regulator as a general 
manager;124 “the Technician,” which is identical to Landis’s (other) 
description of the regulator as “an ordinary guy”;125 and “the 
Facilitator,” which is a mediator-like regulator, whose role is to facilitate 
public deliberation.126  Admittedly, the finally type is hardly to be found 
in the book. 
The Guardian 
The image of the regulator as the Guardian is best described in the 
book in the following manner: 
One of the ablest administrators that it was my good fortune to 
know, I believe, never read, at least more than casually, the 
statutes that he translated into reality.  He assumed that they 
gave him power to deal with broad problems of an industry and, 
upon that understanding, he sought his own solutions.127 
Two traits of this regulator support its claim to expertise: (1) its 
managerial abilities; and (2) its visionary, interdisciplinary, and 
overarching outlook.128  Thus, for example, at one point Landis opines 
that “[t]he direction of any large corporation presents difficulties 
 
123.  See Sagy, Triptych of Regulators, supra note 14.  
124.  Id. at 435–41, 467–70. 
125.  Id. at 441–44, 470–72. 
126.  Id. at 432–35, 463–67; see also Sagy, The Legacy of Social Darwinism, supra 
note 96. 
127.  LANDIS, supra note 21, at 75.  Landis does not tell us who the administrator is but 
adds, “Limitations upon his powers that counsel brought to his attention, naturally, he 
respected.”  Id.  This admission is noteworthy, for it brilliantly captures Landis’s idea of the 
perfect legislation—ultimately, one that the administrator does not really need to be 
bothered with but just to know that it is out there. 
128.  This is also the interpretation presented in Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A 
Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 355 (1998) (arguing 
that Landis “likened the role of the administrative agency to that of a board of directors for 
an industry, able to use its fact-finding powers and panoramic perch to reach judgments more 
balanced and farsighted than those accessible to more partial parties”). 
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comparable in character to those faced by an administrative 
commission.”129  This was a pregnant analogy in post-1929 America.  
The demand for the regulation of many “industries with sickness,”130 in 
the wake of the Great Crash,131 showed that this corporate-style model 
of governance was far from flawless.  It did not guarantee beneficial 
results; it had not in the past.  Still, what Landis had in mind is a “more 
comprehensive, more responsible”132 mega-management of a whole 
industry (for example, the railroad) by the appropriate agency.  This 
kind of management would attend both to the “public needs” as well as 
to “achieving the best possible operation of the [industry].”133  Landis 
would reiterate this formula in later years.134  So would others.135 
Ingrained in this approach is the understanding that sound 
regulation depends on disruption of “the traditional tripartite theory of 
governmental organization”136—and herein lay, of course, a serious 
bone of contention between the New Dealers and opposing lawyers137—
 
129.  LANDIS, supra note 21, at 10.  Jaffe would later on reject this analogy, arguing that 
“it is not in my opinion sound to compare the Government to a large corporation.  Relative to 
government a corporation is a single-purpose organization.  Our federal establishment must 
take account of a vast congeries of interests.”  Louis L. Jaffe, Basic Issues: An Analysis, 30 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1273, 1277 (1955) [hereinafter Jaffe, Basic Issues]. 
130.  LANDIS, supra note 21, at 14. 
131.  On the Great Crash, see, for example, JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE GREAT 
CRASH, 1929 (1954); CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER, MANIAS, PANICS, AND CRASHES: A 
HISTORY OF FINANCIAL CRISES 64–68 (4th ed. 2000); MAURY KLEIN, RAINBOW’S END: 
THE CRASH OF 1929 (2001).  
132.  LANDIS, supra note 21, at 13. 
133.  Id. at 13–14. 
134.  Thus, in 1961 Landis called for “the development of procedures of a non-judicial 
nature that are more readily adaptable to the resolution of issues arising in complicated 
administrative proceedings. . . .  [F]or the issue in these cases is fundamentally that of 
reaching a sound business judgment that takes into account the public interest.”  James M. 
Landis, Perspectives on the Administrative Process, 14 ADMIN. L. REV. 66, 73 (1961) 
[hereinafter Landis, Perspectives on the Administrative Process].  Complaints of agencies’ 
over-judicialized procedures were common in the 1950s.  See, e.g., MARVER H. BERNSTEIN, 
REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION 29, 34, 58, passim (1955). 
135.  See, e.g., Harvey Pinney, The Case for Independence of Administrative Agencies, 
221 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 40, 44 (1942) (“Regulation as Management”).  But 
see supra note 129 (Jaffe’s rejection of the analogy). 
136.  LANDIS, supra note 21, at 11–12 (“[W]hen government concerns itself with the 
stability of an industry it is only intelligent realism for it to follow the industrial rather than 
the political analogue.  It vests the necessary powers with the administrative authority it 
creates, not too greatly concerned with the extent to which such action does violence to the 
traditional tripartite theory of governmental organization.”). 
137.  See, e.g., Caldwell, supra note 98, at 973 (“If there is anything of which we can be 
relatively sure after some hundred, even thousands, of years of experience with judicial 
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and of traditional disciplinary divisions.138  As Landis makes clear when 
he invokes the analogy between regulation and business management, 
“incredible areas of fact may be involved in the disposition of a business 
problem that calls not only for legal intelligence but also for wisdom in 
the ways of industrial operation.”139 
The Technician 
The other paradigm of expertise—that of the Technician type—is 
straightforwardly presented toward the end of the book’s first chapter,140 
when Landis compares two possible ways of presenting cases dealing 
with potential breaches of a security-acquisition rule: 
 
machinery, it is that no man can be trusted to be judge in his own case.”); Pound Report, 
supra note 99, at 342 (“The increased tasks of the central government and new demands upon 
federal administration . . . give rise to more rather than less need of checks upon the central 
authority . . . .”); see also Ernst Freund, Historical Survey, in THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 9, 33–37 (1923); Nathan Isaacs, Judicial Review of Administrative 
Findings, 30 YALE L.J. 781, 783–86 (1921); Schuyler C. Wallace, Nullification: A Process of 
Government, 45 POL. SCI. Q. 347 (1930); Cooke, supra note 38, at 928–29.  Friends of the 
commission movements were also aware of the difficulty.  Jaffe, as a notable example, wrote 
in 1955, “Without doubt the most acute problem of our administrative system is created by 
the so-called combination of prosecuting and adjudicating functions within one agency.”  
Jaffe, Basic Issues, supra note 129, at 1278.  For further analysis of this debate, see generally 
Sagy, The Manager, the Judge, and the Empiricist, supra note 31, at 109–21. 
The concern about the commingling of the various constitutional powers remained 
uppermost in the minds of legal thinkers throughout the twentieth century.  Notably, see 
THEODORE J. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM: THE SECOND REPUBLIC OF THE UNITED 
STATES (2d ed. 1979); see also, for example, David SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT 
RESPONSIBILITY: HOW CONGRESS ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION (1993).   
138.  See, e.g., LANDIS, supra note 21. 
139.  Id. at 31; see also Landis, Perspectives on the Administrative Process, supra note 
134, at 67.  In this 1961 article, Landis said, among other things, “I cannot stress too 
emphatically the need inherent in the administrative process for the utilization of disciplines 
other than law.”  Id.  This is clearly a Realist argument, as best exemplified in the classic 
Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 474 (1897), where Holmes 
famously said, 
I look forward to a time when the part played by history in the explanation of 
dogma shall be very small, and instead of ingenious research we shall spend our 
energy on a study of the ends sought to be attained and the reasons for desiring 
them.  As a step toward that ideal it seems to me that every lawyer ought to seek an 
understanding of economics. 
See also, e.g., Roscoe Pound, The Place of Procedure in Modern Law, 1 SW. L. REV. 59, 63 
(1917) [hereinafter Pound, The Place of Procedure in Modern Law]; Hessel E. Yntema, The 
Rational Basis of Legal Science, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 925 (1931); see also infra note 232 
(suggesting Landis was a “constructive” Realist).  
140.  LANDIS, supra note 21, at 27, 30, 35, 87.  It is hinted elsewhere in the book as well.  
See id. at 76.  
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The presentation of these and other cases by one body [(here, 
the FTC)], rather than by a heterogeneous group of individual 
claimants or even by district attorneys with varying sympathies 
and abilities, permits the development of consistency in 
approach to such problems, as well as the creation of effective 
routines of investigation and examination.  The deep significance 
of these factors has been aptly phrased by Gerard Henderson in 
his observation that “. . . the science of administration owes its 
being to the fact that most government affairs are run by men of 
average capabilities, and that it is necessary to supply such men 
with a routine and ready-made technique . . . .”141 
This is a startling series of statements.142  It is clear that, as Jaffe put 
it, “they are offered by Landis not to discount his glowing picture of 
administrative potentiality but rather to spur agencies on to even greater 
accomplishments and to secure for them the fullest measure of power to 
overcome these latent threats to their effective action.”143  However, 
according to Jaffe, be it as it may that Henderson’s views pull in the 
opposite direction, they “add up in essence to the traditional wisdom 
concerning the routine conservatism of bureaucracies.”144  Additional 
analysis of Landis’s passage reveals even further how material this 
passage is.  
Consider primarily Henderson’s “observation.”145  Reading 
Henderson’s words, the first question that comes to mind is, Where did 
a “science of administration” come from all of a sudden?  When the 
book was written, the science of administration was associated with 
political scientists, notably the members of the President’s Committee 
on Administrative Management,146 whose pronounced centralist vision 
 
141.  Id. at 40–41 (second and third alterations in original) (emphasis added) (quoting 
GERARD C. HENDERSON, THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION: A STUDY IN 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCEDURE 328 (1924)); see also Nebolsine, supra note 38, at 
1930 (“[O]ur administrative agencies, in the long run, will be operated by people of average 
ability . . . .”).  
142.  To be sure, the invocation of the Technician paradigm is not just an unfortunate 
slip-of-tongue.  See similarly LANDIS, supra note 21, at 87 (“In the business of governing a 
nation—to paraphrase Gerard Henderson again—we must take into account the fact that 
government will be operated by men of average talent and average ability and we must 
therefore devise our administrative processes with that in mind.”). 
143.  Jaffe, James Landis, supra note 38, at 323. 
144.  Id. 
145.  Id. 
146.  On the science of administration and the President’s Committee, see, for example, 
PERI E. ARNOLD, MAKING THE MANAGERIAL PRESIDENCY: COMPREHENSIVE 
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of the federal administrative state147 ran afoul of Landis’s endorsement 
of independent commissions.148 
By subscribing to Henderson’s approach, Landis comes as close as 
he gets in the book to adopting the Committee’s vantage point on the 
administrative process, which indeed assumes that administrators are 
“men of average capabilities,” who must be routinely and minutely 
directed.149  Regulators, opined Henderson in the lines (that Landis 
chose to omit) following the just-quoted paragraph, should also be 
“confine[d] . . . to a formal procedure.”150  These constraints, Henderson 
goes on to note, “may indeed at times clip the wings of genius, but . . . 
will serve to create conditions under which average men are more likely 
to arrive at just results.”151 
 
REORGANIZATION PLANNING, 1905–1980 (1986); KARL, supra note 100; Nicholas Henry, 
The Emergence of Public Administration as a Field of Study, in A CENTENNIAL HISTORY OF 
THE AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 37 (Ralph Clark Chandler ed., 1987); Paul P. Van 
Riper, The American Administrative State: Wilson and the Founders, in A CENTENNIAL 
HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE STATE, supra, at 3; Wallace S. Sayre, 
Premises of Public Administration: Past and Emerging, 18 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 102 (1958). 
147.  Indeed, the operative principle that reigned supreme in the realm of public 
administration at the time was of centralization, as “[a]dministration is that function of 
government which demands for its proper exercise centralization of power and 
responsibility.”  Herman G. James, The City Manager Plan, The Latest in American City 
Government, 8 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 602, 608 (1914).  See generally ARNOLD, supra note 146, 
at 11–14; KARL, supra note 100, at 92–113; MARTIN J. SCHIESL, THE POLITICS OF 
EFFICIENCY: MUNICIPAL ADMINISTRATION AND REFORM IN AMERICA, 1800–1920, at 68–
87, 133–48, 171–88 (1977). 
Accordingly, the principle of centralization pervades The President’s Committee Report 
and is replicated at all levels of the bureaucracy.  See THE PRESIDENT’S COMMITTEE 
REPORT, supra note 100, at 30 (asserting the need for “centralizing the determination of 
administrative policy [so] that there is a clear line of conduct laid down for all officialdom to 
follow”); infra note 149; see also DAVID H. ROSENBLOOM, BUILDING A LEGISLATIVE-
CENTERED PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION: CONGRESS AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE, 
1946–1999, at 12–20 (2000). 
148.  See supra note 121 (Landis pleading the cause of independent commissions). 
149.  See THE PRESIDENT’S COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 100, at 2 (calling for “the 
establishment of a responsible and effective chief executive as the center of energy, direction, 
and administrative management; the systematic organization of all activities in the hands of a 
qualified personnel under the direction of the chief executive; and to aid him in this, the 
establishment of appropriate managerial and staff agencies”).  The administrator is a 
“specialist,” to use Weber’s term.  2 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 1001 (Ephraim 
Fischoff et al. trans., Guenther Roth & Clauss Wittich eds., 1978); cf. STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, 
BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE: THE EXPANSION OF NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE 
CAPACITIES, 1877–1920, at 47–84, 177–211 (1982) (describing the U.S. civil service reform 
movement in the Progressive Era). 
150.  HENDERSON, supra note 141, at 328. 
151.  Id. 
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Whence, then, do regulators acquire expertise?  “[E]xpertness,” 
Landis declares in a passage that clearly relates to the Technician type 
of regulator, “springs only from that continuity of interest, that ability 
and desire to devote fifty-two weeks a year, year after year, to a 
particular problem.”152  These are the two key components in his 
definition.  First is the regulators’ “continuity of concern”153 with 
commission business.154  Elsewhere Landis speaks of regulators as “men 
ready to devote their lives” to regulation155 and goes so far as to 
stipulate that “in the final analysis it will be seen that the term 
‘independence’ is but synonymous with the professional attitude of the 
career man in government.”156  Second is the “single-mindedness of 
devotion to a specific problem.”157  The resultant imagery could not be 
more antithetical to that of the Guardian regulator: whereas the former 
seeks to transcend the sectional, bounded perspective,158 the latter is 
single-minded.159 
E. Epilogue: Disenchantment? 
On December 26, 1960, Landis handed to President-elect John F. 
Kennedy a detailed report appraising the performance of federal 
administrative agencies.160  Landis conducted a general survey of the 
field along with a specific study of a number of key agencies, such as the 
 
152.  LANDIS, supra note 21, at 23. 
153.  Id. at 120. 
154.  This is a repeated theme in the book.  See id. at 26, 96, 144. 
155.  James M. Landis, Significance of Administrative Commissions in the Growth of the 
Law, 12 IND. L.J. 471, 477 (1937) [hereinafter Landis, Significance of Administrative 
Commissions]. 
156.  Id. at 481. 
157.  LANDIS, supra note 21, at 35; see also id. at 27, 30, 87. 
158.  See supra text accompanying notes 136–139 (describing the Guardian type of 
expertise). 
159.  It may indeed be argued that they contradict each other.  See infra Part II.G.1. 
160.  RITCHIE, supra note 34, at 178.  This was not the first report Landis wrote at the 
behest of JFK.  In June 20, 1952, he handed to then-Representative Kennedy a Report on the 
Capital Transit Co.  See PUB. UTILS., INS. & BANKING SUBCOMM. OF THE COMM. ON THE 
DIST. OF COLUMBIA, 82D CONG., CAPITAL TRANSIT: REPORT ON THE CAPITAL TRANSIT 
CO. (Comm. Print. 1952) [hereinafter CAPITAL TRANSIT] (prepared by James M. Landis).  
That report reviewed contending claims regarding the rates charged by Capital Transit, the 
transit corporation serving the District of Columbia at the time.  This investigation again took 
Landis to the realm of public utilities, a subject he was well versed in as one of the drafters of 
the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935.  MCCRAW, supra note 35, at 170–71.  
Kennedy was at the time the Chairman of the Public Utilities, Insurance, and Banking 
Subcommittee of the Committee on the District of Columbia.  CAPITAL TRANSIT, supra. 
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FTC, the Federal Power Commission, and the CAB.161  The report 
concluded with a series of recommendations.162  Its contents tell us a lot 
about Landis’s assessment of the course taken by the federal 
administrative apparatus in the preceding two decades and about his 
understanding of administrative expertise.163 
The report clearly indicates that Landis was not particularly pleased 
with the way in which federal agencies had conducted themselves and 
had been dealt with by others during the 1940s and 1950s.  Among the 
issues he found distressing was (what he saw as) the deterioration in the 
quality of personnel, “both at the top level and throughout the staff,”164 
that led to “the absence of leadership at the top” and which, in turn, 
brought about a situation where “the staffs ha[d] captured the 
commissions.”165 
Consequently, the report’s recommendations revolve around the 
need to draw an able cadre of regulators to run agencies.166  To that end, 
this time around, Landis emphasized the necessity of centralizing the 
administrative apparatus, from top to bottom.167  He prescribed the 
upgrading of commission chairmen’s standing so that it would be 
comparable to that of the President in terms of the wide scope of powers 
they could exert in the management of agencies.  Landis believed that 
 
161.  RITCHIE, supra note 34, at 184. 
162.  THE LANDIS REPORT, supra note 71, at 84–87.  Having written the report, Landis 
became a special presidential assistant in charge of regulatory policy.  RITCHIE, supra note 34, 
at 181; MCCRAW, supra note 35, at 220.  In this capacity he promoted the various 
reorganization plans outlined in the report.  RITCHIE, supra note 34, at 181; MCCRAW, supra 
note 35, at 220.  Due to substantial congressional and lobbyist opposition, he was only 
moderately successful in this effort.  See RITCHIE, supra note 34, at 179–86; see also 
MCCRAW, supra note 35, at 220–21.  
163.  Interestingly enough, Landis devoted a large portion of the discussion to 
Congress’s and the President’s control of agencies but did not say on this occasion what role 
courts should play in the administrative state.  If I am not mistaken, the only reference to 
courts in the report is made in conjunction with Landis’s denunciation of agencies’ unsound 
ethical behavior.  See THE LANDIS REPORT, supra note 71, at 36 (“Never before recent time 
in the history of the administrative process have the federal courts been compelled to return 
administrative decision to the agencies, not because they have erred, but because they have 
departed from those fundamentals of ethics that must characterize equally the performance 
of quasi-judicial and judicial duties.”). 
164.  THE LANDIS REPORT, supra note 71, at 11. 
165.  Id. at 12.  
166.  See, for example, id. at 68, for his suggestion to devise an attractive compensation 
scheme and enact long tenure for commissioners.  See also infra text accompanying note 182. 
167.  Cf. supra note 121 (describing Landis’s argument in favor of the independence of 
agencies). 
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such re-organization of agencies would turn them into more efficient 
bodies.168  Under this scheme, a chairman would “take the lead in the 
formulation of policies[,] . . . appoint[] . . . all personnel[, and] . . . have 
complete authority as to the internal organization of the agency.”169  
This, Landis argued in a language reminiscent of the President’s 
Committee Report, “would permit the centralization of responsibility 
for the operations of the agency in a manner whereby its operation can 
be far more easily evaluated by the Congress, the President and the 
public.”170  Concomitantly, Landis recommended that the President, via 
an “Office of Oversight,”171 would assume full control of regulatory 
bodies, issue necessary reorganization plans to that effect, and be 
granted the authority to appoint agencies’ chairmen, who would serve at 
his pleasure.172 
In so holding, Landis in effect endorsed the core of the President’s 
Committee’s plan.173  He insisted on the desirability of centralization of 
the entire administrative apparatus to a point where it is managed 
 
168.  THE LANDIS REPORT, supra note 71, at 3. 
169.  Id. at 37. 
170.  Id. at 38; cf. THE PRESIDENT’S COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 100, at 43.  
171.  This recommendation resonates well with the current dominant role in regulatory 
affairs of the Office of Management and Budget (the OMB) at the Executive Office of the 
President.  For a short history and analysis of the OMB, see Richard B. Stewart, Essay, 
Administrative Law in the Twenty-First Century, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437 (2003) [hereinafter 
Stewart, Administrative Law in the Twenty-First Century].  See also, e.g., Curtis W. Copeland, 
The Role of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs in Federal Rulemaking, 33 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1257, 1257 (2006) (“The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs 
(OIRA) is one of several statutory offices within the Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB).”); Richard B. Stewart, A New Generation of Environmental Regulation?, 29 CAP. U. 
L. REV. 21 (2001). 
172.  THE LANDIS REPORT, supra note 71, at 84–86.  Landis explains his position based 
on two reasons: first, the President has a constitutional duty to “take Care that the Laws be 
faithfully executed,” see U.S. Const. art. II, § 3, and second, “The Executive . . . is less beset 
by the vested interests in bureaucracy that too often find support from members of the 
Congress,” THE LANDIS REPORT, supra note 71, at 36. 
For criticism on the latter argument, see, for example, Rubenstein, supra note 14, at 2203 
(highlighting the role played by White House officials in (allegedly) controlling agencies and 
arguing that, “[a]part from the fact that these officials are not democratically elected, they 
may be just as or more susceptible to the narrow interests that threaten agency objectivity”), 
and Farina, supra note 100, at 231–32 (“[I]t oversimplifies the motivational structure and 
political environment of officials in both [the legislative and executive] branches.”).  
173.  See supra note 100.  This was noticed by commentators as the Landis Report was 
publicized.  On reactions to the report, see RITCHIE, supra note 34, at 178–79. 
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directly, but also indirectly, by the President.174  Note that this latter 
approach is most compatible with the Technician paradigm of regulator 
and of expertise.  As noted, this paradigm was already invoked by 
Landis in the book.175  In the last chapter of his life, however, Landis 
seemed to wholeheartedly embrace it. 
Lastly, in 1963 Landis practically called for agencies’ restraint, 
emphasizing that “[l]aw can promote but it can also impede.”176  He 
even went so far as to declare that “the administrative agencies should 
make a better demonstration of their much vaunted expertise . . . .  The 
courts, the bar and the public might then tender them the respect they 
were intended to deserve.”177  Harsh words indeed, especially from 
someone who had been the foremost eulogist of that “much vaunted 
expertise.” 
One can only speculate where his mounting criticism of 
administrative commissions would have taken Landis had he not died in 
1964.  Still, I would argue that the Landis Report did not signify “a 
stunning turnaround,” as argued by McCraw, in Landis’s thinking.178  
The list of concerns and suggestions mentioned in the Landis Report 
illustrates, I believe, that, although deeply disappointed by the state of 
the regulatory branch, Landis’s belief in the importance and tenability 
of successful regulation had not faltered along the years.  At the 
beginning of the report he wrote, “[Agencies’] continued existence is 
obviously essential for effective government.  The complexities of our 
modern society are increasing rather than decreasing.”179  A year later, 
he would exclaim that the administrative process “is a lusty infant, 
growing daily in vigor and force.  Its ability to further our democratic 
society and hold together the forces of private enterprise to work for the 
general good, is the great issue that is at stake.”180  Indeed, even in his 
later pronouncements, it is difficult to discern a wavering faith in the 
potential of the administrative process in a democratic society or in its 
 
174.  Thus, although Landis underscores Congress’s role in the supervision of agencies, 
THE LANDIS REPORT, supra note 71, at 83, he maintains that “[t]he leadership of the 
President in these matters [relating to the organization of regulatory agencies] should be 
respected by the Congress unless he is palpably wrong,”  id. at 37.  See also id. at 36. 
175.  See supra text accompanying note 141. 
176.  James M. Landis, Book Review, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 597, 600 (1963). 
177.  Id. at 601; see also RITCHIE, supra note 34, at 188; infra text accompanying 
note 194. 
178.  McCraw, Regulation in America, supra note 26, at 163. 
179.  THE LANDIS REPORT, supra note 71, at 1. 
180.  Landis, Perspectives on the Administrative Process, supra note 134, at 74. 
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vehicles, i.e., agencies and those who direct them.  Likewise, although he 
went so far as to speak in the report of the “breakdown of the 
administrative process,”181 Landis was still confident that “[t]he prime 
key to the improvement of the administrative process is the selection of 
qualified personnel. . . .  As long as the selection of men for key 
administrative posts is based upon political reward rather than 
competency, little else that is done will really matter.”182  Landis was 
similarly still certain that a long tenure would instill a sense of “devotion 
to a career.”183  Harkening back to the crest of the administrative 
process, he was confident as ever that it would create an environment 
where “[e]xpertise would have a better chance to develop and the sense 
of security would inculcate the spirit of independence.”184 
F. Running Themes in Landis’s Work 
Versatile as it was, several themes did run through Landis’s 
impressive corpus of literature.  I wish now to briefly highlight three 
such themes: Landis’s unwavering belief in regulation, his preoccupation 
with the judiciary, and his continuing search for the protector of the 
public interest. 
The first theme follows my last remarks on the report.  True, taking 
a panoramic view of Landis’s various essays, it is evident that he 
believed all along in the great promise of regulation by “qualified” 
administrators.185  He had never forsaken his conviction that agencies 
properly construed could live up to the high expectations of those who 
had envisaged them as powerhouses of social progress.  Barron and 
Rakoff are, therefore, correct in referring to Landis as a former great 
supporter of regulation.186  However, as noted, they wish to make a 
stronger argument with reference to Landis, namely, that he has offered 
a suitable justification for commission-run regulation.187  As this Article 
seeks to illustrate, this latter step is more questionable. 
A second recurring theme in Landis’s work was is preoccupation 
with the judiciary.  Landis kept a running quarrel with the judiciary 
 
181.  THE LANDIS REPORT, supra note 71, at 54. 
182.  Id. at 66. 
183.  Id. at 68. 
184.  Id. 
185.  See supra note 182 and accompanying text. 
186.  See Barron & Rakoff, supra note 1, at 266–67. 
187.  See id. at 269. 
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during most of his life.  He took great pains to expose what he regarded 
as its inadequacies to handle, and prejudices against, administrative 
regulation.188  But it was a passionate battle.  It was an emotional rivalry 
probably because, at heart, Landis was a staunch believer in the great 
role the common law courts could and should play in a modern 
state189—if only they were guided by the prescience and astuteness of 
Holmes and Brandeis.190  Landis’s work, taken as a whole, was therefore 
also an effort to redefine the courts’ place in modern America.  
James Landis was indeed a “Dean of Regulation,” as Donald Ritchie 
put it, but he was also, and even more so, Dean Landis of Harvard Law 
School.191  So, it seems, just like his mentor and co-writer, who harshly 
criticized the Court for many years only later to become Justice 
Frankfurter, Landis never divorced himself from the courts and the rest 
of the legal community.  For however critical Landis was of the courts of 
his times, he still thought that there was something to be learned from 
the judiciary when regulating the market.192  Although he berated the 
judiciary’s performance in recent history, he did not suggest the 
altogether doing away with its modus operandi.193 
 
188.  See supra text accompanying notes 79, 111–14. 
189.  See, e.g., LANDIS, supra note 21, at 135 (“In contract, in tort, in negotiable 
instruments, in trusts—the body of our law is judge-made and represents the successive 
reactions to practical situations of a professional class that was nurtured in the same traditions 
and was subject to the limitations of the same discipline.  That class has had pride in its 
handiwork.  Nor can one deny its right to pride.  But the claim to pride tends, especially in the 
hands of lesser men, to be a boast of perfection.” (footnote omitted)); cf. Learned Hand, The 
Speech of Justice, 29 HARV. L. REV. 617 (1916). 
190.  See infra note 193.  Frankfurter and Landis dedicated their The Business of the 
Supreme Court to Justice Holmes.  FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 75, at iii.  The 
dedication reads as follows: “To Mr. Justice Holmes who, after twenty-five terms, continues 
to contribute his genius to the work of a great court.”  Id. 
191.  See supra text accompanying note 54. 
192.  See, e.g., LANDIS, supra note 21, at 135. 
193.  Nor did he suggest adopting a more progressive judicial attitude, manifested by 
Justice Brandeis, to whose minority opinions Landis repeatedly referred in the last chapter of 
the book.  Id. at 124, 134, 141–42, 151 n.41, 153.  Thus, for example, Landis stipulated that 
“[t]he positive reason for declining judicial review over administrative findings of fact is the 
belief that the expertness of the administrative, if guarded by adequate procedures, can be 
trusted to determine these issues as capably as judges.”  Id. at 142.  Namely, rather than 
suggesting a distinctive standard with regard to administrative “findings of fact,” Landis 
incorporated an idealized notion of the judicial standard of fact-finding into his defense of 
administrative autonomy.  Here is a point where the judicial is evidently not antithetical to 
the administrative but rather its alter-ego.  This suggestion is based on the recognition of a 
distinct legal expertise.  See supra text accompanying note 114. 
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Hence, at some point in the book, Landis, while still calling upon the 
courts to be deferential to agencies, conceded that deference should be 
given differentially and not across the board.  Rather, he wrote, 
“[D]ifferences in treatment should be accorded to findings of fact by 
different administrative officials, because of differences in the facts and 
in the qualities of the administrative to be expert in finding the facts.”194  
This proposition is striking: if it were to be acted upon, the courts would 
become the ultimate evaluators of expertise.  Only when they are 
certain that the regulator under review qualifies as an “expert” should 
they be deferential.  To be sure, even if that were the case, they should 
not withdraw completely from the scene but rather ought to limit 
themselves to truly “legal” questions, that is, questions which are, 
according to the court’s own judgment, in its expertise.195  No wonder, 
then, the role Landis assigns to law, as conceived by courts, is of 
“commanding discipline.”196 
More dramatically, at the end of the book, in its very last paragraph, 
Landis lets loose and prophetically writes: 
Such difficulties as have arisen have come because courts . . . 
assume to themselves expertness in matters of industrial health, 
utility engineering, railroad management, even bread baking.  
The rise of the administrative process represented the hope that 
policies to shape such fields could most adequately be developed 
by men bred to the facts.  That hope is still dominant, but its 
possession bears no threat to our ideal of the “supremacy of 
 
194.  LANDIS, supra note 21, at 153; see also Louis L. Jaffe, Administrative Procedure 
Re-Examined: The Benjamin Report, 56 HARV. L. REV. 704, 726–30 (1943); Louis L. Jaffe, 
Judicial Review: Question of Law, 69 HARV. L. REV. 239, 265 (1955) [hereinafter Jaffe, 
Question of Law] (“Not every agency is envisaged by its legislative creator as expert nor is 
agency expertise always relevant.”); cf. Louis B. Schwartz, Legal Restriction of Competition in 
the Regulated Industries: An Abdication of Judicial Responsibility, 67 HARV. L. REV. 436 
(1954). 
195.  See LANDIS, supra note 21, at 55, 63, 152–55; see also Frug, supra note 40, at 
1335−38; supra text accompanying note 114.  Indeed, it appears that what the book sponsors 
is an invigorated Skidmore-like rule, even more than a Chevron-like rule.  See LANDIS, supra 
note 21, at 144; see also Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984); 
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).  At any rate, Landis, it seems, would not have 
settled for the Court’s holding in NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944).  
There the Court (seemed to have) made the distinction between “pure” questions of law (that 
should be decided independently by the courts) and questions of application of law to fact 
(that should be reviewed only under a standard of reasonableness). 
Cf. Barron and Rakoff’s discussion of the proper scope of judicial review of—and 
deference accorded to—agencies under big waiver, supra note 1, at 323–24. 
196.  LANDIS, supra note 21, at 154. 
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law.”  Instead, it lifts it to new heights where the great judge, like 
a conductor of a many-tongued symphony, from what would 
otherwise be discord, makes known through the voice of many 
instruments the vision that has been given him of man’s destiny 
upon this earth.197 
This “supremacy clause” vividly shows that, with all his bitter 
condemnation of the courts, Landis wanted to preserve the supremacy 
of law, which is in the realm of the courts, as we have seen.  All this 
leads to the conclusion that, “in the last analysis,” it is the destiny of 
“the great judge,” who, as we have seen, is proficient (only) in answering 
“questions that lawyers are equipped to decide,” to be the ultimate 
conductor of public affairs.198 
A third frequent theme in Landis’s diverse writings is his acute 
concern for the public interest in the face of recalcitrant financial 
markets, monopolies, and reactionary forces within and without the 
legal arena.199  I suggest we read his scholarship with an eye on the 
question: Which branch of government is the true depositor, and thus 
the trustworthy guardian, of the public interest?  Throughout the years, 
Landis gave three answers to this question. 
First, Landis put his trust in Congress as a representative body.200  
Later, during the New Deal, he was certain that powerful, independent 
agencies, instead of Congress, were the ones to safeguard the public 
interest.201  Now, he derided “the turmoil of a legislative chamber.”202  
Finally, in the Landis Report, he turned to the Executive for solace.  
Whereas in the book he spoke of the debilitating effect of “the varying 
tempers of changing administrations” on regulatory tribunals,203 at that 
point he put his trust in the very head of the (presidential) 
administration.204 
 
197.  Id. at 155.  
198.  Id. at 152, 155 (emphasis added).  Needless to say, this approach is not compatible 
with Barron and Rakoff’s understanding of courts’ part in big waiver regulation.  See Barron 
& Rakoff, supra note 1, at 323–24. 
199.  See, e.g., LANDIS, supra note 21, at 42–43. 
200.  See Landis, The Study of Legislation in Law Schools, supra note 64, at 436 (“The 
currents of public opinion, changes in the postulates of our civilization, express themselves in 
the legislative chamber . . . .”); supra text accompanying note 92. 
201.  See LANDIS, supra note 21, at 76. 
202.  Id. at 70. 
203.  Id. at 113. 
204.  Supra text accompanying note 172. 
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Landis’s meandering through the various branches of government 
obviously involves the issue of legitimacy.  Having left behind his first 
choice (Congress), Landis was faced with the lack-of-democratic-
legitimacy argument.205  Accordingly, his conception of administrative 
expertise, certainly as prescribed in the book, brings questions of 
commissions’ democratic legitimacy to the fore.206  There is a good 
reason for this.  In the book, Landis does not seem to be particularly 
impressed by a majority show of hands when questions of expertise are 
debated.207  At any rate, at that stage, Landis does not seem to put too 
much trust in the “mass.”208  He demands that regulators follow suit.209  
Actually, it is the very concept of expertise that demands it.  At the 
heart of any conceivable model of expertise lies the exclusion of the 
non-expert “mass.”  As Harold Laski stated it in 1930, “The expert, in 
short, remains expert upon the condition that he does not seek to co-
ordinate his specialism with the total sum of human knowledge.”210  
“The moment that he seeks that coordination,” Laski concluded, “he 
ceases to be an expert.”211 
 
205.  See Sagy, Triptych of Regulators, supra note 14, at 458 n.190; supra note 14; infra 
note 296 and accompanying text (exploring the proverbial meaning of such an argument). 
206.  Landis was of course aware of that.  See Tushnet, supra note 40, at 1574 
(“Frankfurter and Landis worried that expert administrative agencies—however effective 
they were as instruments of governance—might lack democratic legitimacy.  Both men 
struggled to articulate accounts that explained why agencies were indeed properly 
democratic.”).  In a wonderful remark included in a 1937 article, Landis commented, “[A]s 
the public finally determined to place itself in the driver’s seat with reference to some of the 
major problems of its life, it created these new mechanisms of administration to serve its 
ends.”  Landis, Significance of Administrative Commissions, supra note 155, at 473.  The 
message was clear: it was the public who was sitting all along in the driver’s seat, not 
unelected agencies. 
207.  See LANDIS, supra note 21, at 57–59.  This was another reason for Landis’s dislike 
of the NIRA.  See id.; see also supra note 115.  To be sure, this is not the only case where 
Landis criticized agencies’ performance.  See also LANDIS, supra note 21, at 68, 75, 78, 104, 
106. 
208.  LANDIS, supra note 21, at 61; see also id. at 43. 
209.  This is made clear, inter alia, by Landis’s approval of the fact that “[t]he 
administrative is not open to the broad range of human sympathies to which the judicial 
process is subject.”  Id. at 99. 
210.  Harold J. Laski, The Limitations of the Expert, HARPER’S MONTHLY MAG., Dec. 
1, 1930, at 101, 105. 
211.  Id.  Generally, as we know, the rise of professionalism has been widely rooted in 
claims of expertise.  The study of administrative expertise can therefore insightfully draw on 
literature dedicated to the study of professionalism.  In the present context, see, for example, 
MAGALI SARFATTI LARSON, THE RISE OF PROFESSIONALISM: A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 
(1977), and Stanley Fish, Anti-Professionalism, 7 CARDOZO L. REV. 645, 646 (1986) 
(“[P]rofessions characteristically justify their special status by claiming ‘cognitive 
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Already, Socrates, more than two millennia ago, held that view: 
[Socrates.] . . .  Was the disciple in gymnastics supposed to 
attend to the praise and blame and opinion of every man, or of 
one man only—his physician or trainer, whoever that was? 
[Crito.]  Of one man only. 
. . . . 
[Socrates.]  And he ought to live and train, and eat and drink 
in the way which seems good to his single master who has 
understanding, rather than according to the opinion of all other 
men put together? 
[Crito.]  True.212 
Encapsulated in this dialogue is not only the democratic-legitimacy 
difficulty but also Landis’s book’s answer to the challenge.  When it 
comes to regulation, Landis was adamant that the “single master” must 
be the administrative commission of his design.213  The question is, of 
course, How tenable was—and is—this answer?  Soon we will delve 
deeper into this question.  But before we do so, we must note this: 
Landis’s later endorsement of the model of presidential regulation 
clearly signifies his growing recognition that, standing alone, assertions 
of expertise could not justify the administrative state.214 
G. The Administrative Process In Defense of Big Waiver? 
The book, with which Landis is associated more than any other 
publication, will be the focal point of the following discussion.  In this 
Part I will explain my position that supporting big waiver based on The 
Administrative Process and Landis, especially Landis as seen through 
the prism of that book, is theoretically unsound and even risky from a 
practical point of view.  Put differently, this Part will be bi-focal.  It will 
jointly address two levels of analysis: the more “theoretical” level, which 
will highlight “what Landis failed to notice,” along with the more 
“practical” level, which will suggest, “why Landis won’t work today.”  
To be sure, I do not argue for a clear separation between these two 
 
exclusiveness’, a unique access to some area of knowledge that is deemed crucial to the well-
being of society . . . .” (footnote omitted) (quoting MAGALI SARFATTI LARSON, THE RISE OF 
PROFESSIONALISM: A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 15 (1977)). 
212.  PLATO, Crito, in 3 THE WORKS OF PLATO: FOUR VOLUMES IN ONE 135, 146–47 
(Benjamin Jowett trans., Tudor Publishing Co. 1945) (1875). 
213.  See LANDIS, supra note 21, at 1–2. 
214.  See THE LANDIS REPORT, supra note 71, at 85–87. 
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levels of discussion; they are merely given as points of orientation.  
Basically, they both revolve around the issue of the legitimacy of 
regulation in the United States.  Since legitimacy is such a complex 
concept—potentially involving issues of legality, public acceptance, and 
morality215—it is only to be expected that addressing legitimacy 
concerns will touch upon both the more “purely” theoretical as well as 
the more practical aspects of regulation.   
This Part will present five major reasons to consider the book as ill-
founded to the extent that it is likewise unsound to base big waiver (and 
other like instruments) on the book’s framework:  
(1)  the book’s unsettled, dual vision of administrative expertise;  
(2)  its naturalistic undertone;  
(3)  the fact/theory binary opposition that pervades it;  
(4)  Landis’s (surprising) lack of realism in the investigation of 
regulation; and, most damaging, 
(5)  the fact that, at bottom, the book fails to provide an adequate 
description of expertise. 
Just as important to this Article’s thesis, throughout the following 
scrutiny of these five reasons for the book’s failure, mention shall be 
made of Jaffe’s position on each of the five counts.  This will introduce 
Jaffe’s—often contrasting—views on fundamental theoretical aspects of 
regulation. 
1. Which Landis?  What Type of Expertise? 
Landis’s reputed principal mission in The Administrative Process was 
to establish a relatively clear, relatively certain, and relatively accessible 
model of “grand” expertise.216  Primarily, what he failed to notice was 
that, rather than presenting a good-enough portrayal of the expert 
regulator he probably sought to propagate, he provided his readers with 
two conflicting images of expert regulators.217  Indeed, it may be argued 
that the two types of regulators are mutually contradictory: the 
Guardian is defined as the mirror image—as the negation—of the 
Technician, and the manner in which the latter is described casts a doubt 
 
215.  See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. 
REV. 1787, 1790–802 (2005) (exploring the different meanings of “legitimacy”); Sagy, 
Triptych of Regulators, supra note 14, at 457–59. 
216.  See Koch, supra note 40, at 426. 
217.  See supra text accompanying notes 151, 158–159. 
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on the aspirations of the former, laudable as they may be, to transcend a 
bureaucratic parochial outlook and offer an imaginative perspective.218 
 Yet one does not have to buy into the latter argument in order to 
realize that the mere coexistence of more than one prototype of 
regulator and of expertise in the book must call into question any 
reliance on it in support of regulatory practices.  After all, if I am correct 
in arguing for the book’s duality of paradigms, those relying on Landis, 
the book, or both must first explain on which image of Landisian 
regulation they base their arguments.  Neither the book nor the diverse 
scholarship Landis has produced in the various stations of his 
professional life support a unitary perception of “the Landis model of 
regulation/expertise.”  
Nor, I should add, can readers of the book take refuge in the 
common understanding the book has acquired over the years.  The 
contradictory evidence found in the book is simply overwhelming, as 
had been noted before by at least one prominent former reader of the 
book—Jaffe.219  Indeed, the two visions of the administrator as a 
Guardian, or commander-in-chief, on the one hand, or as a Technician 
civil servant or a pen pusher, on the other, are recapitulated time and 
again in the book.  
2. Naturalism for Our Age? 
Naturalism220 was at the zenith of its influence in the United States 
during the half century stretching from, say, the mid-1880s forward.221 It 
 
218.  See also Sagy, Triptych of Regulators, supra note 14, at 432, 462–63, for a 
comparison between the types. 
219.  See supra text accompanying note 144. 
220.  A clarification—the terms naturalism and empiricism (both terms could be used 
interchangeably in this Article’s context) lend themselves to various interpretations.  There is 
obviously no need to conclusively define these terms here.  All that is needed, it seems to me, 
is to interpret them consistently.  I chose to follow Edward Purcell’s definition not because it 
is the most cogent, but because his work will be heavily drawn on in the following paragraphs.  
Purcell’s analysis is based on the understanding that “scientific naturalism” stands for the 
following two principles: (1) a rejection of absolute thinking—“No a priori truths existed, and 
metaphysics was merely a cover for human ignorance and superstition”; and (2) 
scientificity—“Only concrete, scientific investigations could yield true knowledge, . . . and 
that knowledge was empirical, particular, and experimentally verifiable.”  See EDWARD A. 
PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY: SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM & THE 
PROBLEM OF VALUE 3 (1973).  To repeat, thus understood, naturalism is scientific positivism.  
See generally the excellent discussion in IAN HACKING, REPRESENTING AND INTERVENING: 
INTRODUCTORY TOPICS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF NATURAL SCIENCE (1983), and especially 
see id. at 2–6, 41–57.  Compare the definition of “naturalism” in THE CAMBRIDGE 
DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY 596 (Robert Audi ed., 2d ed. 1999), with DAVID J. HESS, 
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was an epoch enamored with Darwinism222 and Pragmatism,223 the 
period of the rise of the great universities and of the scientific ethos and 
the decline of seminaries and theology.224  No wonder that legal 
academia was also drawn into naturalism in the beginning of the 
twentieth century.225 
Naturalism overtly and happily accords priority to observable facts 
over conjunctures.226  A naturalistic approach prides itself in not 
reverting to metaphysical, non-experimentally-verifiable formulae when 
explicating a given phenomenon.227  Simply put, a naturalistic 
perspective demands that previously held convictions be cleansed of 
every trace of metaphysics.228  This is to be done by exposing them to a 
strict factual examination.229  The deep belief in the power of ascertained 
facts—as opposed to metaphysics—and trustworthy fact finding to 
assure the progress of society could not be overstated.  
So, too, with Landis’s book.230  As an illustration, here is one 
important example of the book’s naturalistic viewpoint.  Landis rests the 
arc of this plot on the assumption that, if you left the regulatory decision 
 
SCIENCE STUDIES: AN ADVANCED INTRODUCTION 30–34 (1997).  But see also ALASDAIR 
MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY 79–87 (2d ed. 1984), for an 
argument that naturalism and empiricism are not compatible concepts. 
221.  See PURCELL, supra note 220, at 3–39. 
222.  See RICHARD HOFSTADTER, SOCIAL DARWINISM IN AMERICAN THOUGHT (rev. 
ed. 1955); Sagy, The Legacy of Social Darwinism, supra note 96, at 500–11; see also Joseph B. 
Eastman, The Place of the Independent Commission, 12 CONST. REV. 95, 97 (1928) (“The 
independent commissions are the evolutionary product of public need.”). 
223.  On the age of Pragmatism, see BRUCE KUKLICK, A HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY IN 
AMERICA, 1720–2000, at 95–197 (2001), and LOUIS MENAND, THE METAPHYSICAL CLUB 
337–75 (2001).  
224.  See KUKLICK, supra note 223, at 97–110.  Kuklick writes that “[t]he amateur men 
of letters who were a force to be reckoned with in the middle of the nineteenth century 
suffered about as much as professional theologians.”  Id. at 107.  See generally THOMAS L. 
HASKELL, THE EMERGENCE OF PROFESSIONAL SOCIAL SCIENCE: THE AMERICAN SOCIAL 
SCIENCE ASSOCIATION AND THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY CRISIS OF AUTHORITY (1977). 
225.  PURCELL, supra note 220, at 83–91; see also infra note 232 (describing 
“constructive” Legal). 
226.  See MACINTYRE, supra note 220, at 79–81. 
227.  See id. at 80–81. 
228.  See id. at 79–81. 
229.  This proposition has its problems, of course.  See infra Part II.G.2 & 3.   
230.  Rudd similarly argues that Landis’s analysis relied on “a form of scientific 
reductionism,” a characterization that seems to correspond nicely to my use of the term 
“naturalism.”  Rudd, supra note 67, at 1057.  
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to those few who are really doing the job on the ground,231 their intimate 
knowledge of the subject matter—indeed, the subject-matter itself—
would dictate the right decisions.232  Hence, for example, as we have 
seen, Landis held that “expertness . . . springs only from that continuity 
of interest, that ability and desire to devote fifty-two weeks a year, year 
after year, to a particular problem.”233  We have already noted the two 
components of this approach (“continuity of interest” and the focus on 
one “particular problem”).234  Landis insisted that, without fail, both 
elements yield the most beneficial and efficacious agencies.  What 
interests me at this point is to demonstrate that he applied a naturalistic 
logic with respect to both elements: (1) for instance, he contends that, 
due to judicial conservatism, “[t]here was . . . hesitation by the Congress 
to wait for the viewpoint of the judiciary to tally with the growing 
conceptions that an administrative agency might evolve [(the effect)] as 
a consequence of its continuing concern with the well-being of industry 
[(the cause)],”235 and (2) “as an agency of government confined to a 
fairly narrow field [(the cause)], its singleness of concern quickly 
 
231.  See LANDIS, supra note 21, at 69 (“The agency’s compactness gives some assurance 
against the entry of impertinent considerations into the deliberations relating to a projected 
solution.”). 
232.  See id. at 49, 51.  Again, Landis was not alone in this.  In fact, this approach was 
typical of the “constructive,” as opposed to the “deconstructive,” side of Legal Realism, as 
depicted by Gary Peller.  See Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1151, 1219–59 (1985), where the author explains that, “[i]n contrast to the 
deconstructive strand of legal realism which denied that any social phenomena could be 
rationally or neutrally grouped under generalities, this [constructive] approach implicitly 
accepted the possibility of neutral generality, insofar as it was ruled by objective reality,” id. 
at 1225–26.  Compare Purcell’s similar characterization of theoretical differences between 
Karl N. Llewellyn and Jerome Frank.  PURCELL, supra note 220, at 81–86; see also HORWITZ, 
supra note 40, at 208–12 (“Realism: Critical or Scientific?”); Joseph William Singer, Legal 
Realism Now, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 465, 467–77 (1988) (book review). 
According to “constructive” Legal Realism, Peller explains, “Determinacy could be 
achieved by focusing on the objectively observable tangibles presented in [pending legal] . . . 
cases, which determined the true similarity or difference that the legal categories obscured.  
Legal activity then could be seen as determinate to the extent that it was a derivative function 
of these facts.”  Peller, supra, at 1242.  In other words, according to this view, only observable, 
objective facts—rather than words, categories, and other theories—could ensure 
determinacy.  They also ensured, according to Thurman Arnold, moral clarity.  See 
THURMAN W. ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT 125 (1935) (“[S]ociety is able to 
suppress its humanitarian instincts by looking at the suffering of its unfortunate members 
through the darkened windows of fundamental economic theories.”). 
233.  LANDIS, supra note 21, at 23. 
234.  See infra text accompanying note 152. 
235.  LANDIS, supra note 21, at 96. 
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develops a professionalism of spirit—an attitude that perhaps more than 
rules affords assurance of informed and balanced judgments [(the 
salutary effect)].”236 
Moving to current affairs, the fact that the book’s key theses smack 
of naturalism does not bode well for their success in shoring up big 
waiver today.  Already in Landis’s lifetime, not long after the New Deal, 
naturalistic perceptions would be widely, even scornfully, rejected and 
eclipsed by relativistic attitudes about science and culture.237  Space 
clearly does not permit a fuller treatment of this subject.  Suffice it to 
note that, following the atrocities of World War II, the advent of the 
Cold War, and the rise of new revolutionary scientific theories (such as 
Einstein’s General Theory of Relativity and the Heisenberg Uncertainty 
Principle), naturalism’s deterministic, progressive attitude lost much of 
its luster, especially among the intelligentsia.238 
As we shall see, Jaffe’s work would reflect the shift from naturalism 
to relativism in his post-New Deal essays.239  We need not trouble 
 
236.  Id. at 99. 
237.  “Relativism” may be a confusing term, especially in the philosophy of science.  See 
HESS, supra note 220, at 34–39.  Often a distinction is made between “epistemic relativism,” 
which holds that “knowledge is rooted in a particular time and culture . . . [and] does not just 
mimic nature,” and “judgment relativism,” which asserts that “all forms of knowledge are 
‘equally valid,’ and . . . we cannot compare different forms of knowledge and discriminate 
among them.”  Karin D. Knorr-Cetina & Michael Mulkay, Introduction: Emerging Principles 
in Social Studies of Science, in SCIENCE OBSERVED: PERSPECTIVES ON THE SOCIAL STUDY 
OF SCIENCE 1, 5 (Karin D. Knorr-Cetina & Michael Mulkay eds., 1983) (emphasis added).  
Note that the second proposition is exposed to an obvious criticism: “To deny that there are 
any fixed or universal criteria of truth or rationality does not necessitate the abandonment of 
any criteria at all.”  DAVID TURNBULL, MASONS, TRICKSTERS AND CARTOGRAPHERS 221 
(2000).  Richard Brown, in rejecting the abovementioned “absolutist type of judgmental 
relativism,” formulates a “nonabsolutist” version, which holds, “Judgment relativism does not 
flatten or negate all judgments; it only advises that they are unlikely to be universally 
adequate.”  RICHARD HARVEY BROWN, TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC SCIENCE: SCIENTIFIC 
NARRATION AND CIVIC COMMUNICATION 11 (1998).  This formulation, I believe, best 
captures Jaffe’s relativism, which is discussed infra Part III.B.  
238.  See PURCELL, supra note 220, at 47–114; PETER NOVICK, THAT NOBLE DREAM: 
THE “OBJECTIVITY QUESTION” AND THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL PROFESSION 133–67 
(1988).  I should also note that, at times, Purcell appears to ignore the important distinction 
between the two kinds of relativisms.  See, e.g., PURCELL, supra note 220, at 51–62.  It seems 
to me that, for the most part, “relativism” in his analysis is judgment (or ethical) relativism 
united with strict empiricism.  In his story opponents of relativism (e.g., the church and people 
like Roscoe Pound) resented what seemed to them as its no-matter-what adherence to 
empiricism and refusal of an a priori prioritizing of one set of ethical or ideological codes over 
another.  Novick’s account, on the other hand, explains the spread of the Theory of Relativity 
and relativism with a careful use of these terms.  NOVICK, supra, at 133–67. 
239.  See infra text accompanying note 321. 
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ourselves with the intriguing question of whether the cultural mood in 
the United States of today may be still characterized as “relativistic” or 
whether a different characterization is more apt.240  Be that as it may, it 
does not seem sensible to base a major regulatory innovation, such as 
big waiver, on a discredited worldview—especially after, as we shall now 
see, its applicability in the construction of a justification for regulation 
had already been widely denounced. 
3. The Fact/Theory Dichotomy 
Strong evidence for the book’s naturalism can be found in the 
distinction between fact and theory, which permeates its reasoning.241  
The many dichotomies that circulate in the book gravitate towards this 
meta binary opposition.242  According to Landis, the first concept is the 
realm of commissions, while the second is essentially that of the other 
branches of government.243  This juxtaposition of the theoretical versus 
the practical has a personal dimension in Landis’s narrative.244  On one 
side of the divide stand Landis and his allies and, on the other side, 
those who draw “too readily upon words”245 and who are drawn to 
“finely spun logomachy which is the delight of lawyers and judges.”246  
Similarly, already in 1924 Landis admonished the courts for “think[ing] 
words instead of things.”247  Now, in the book, he contrasted arguments 
 
240.  See, e.g., Leon M. Lederman, The Bizarre and Serendipitous History of Discovery, 
in NEXT: THE COMING ERA IN SCIENCE 3 (Holcomb B. Noble ed., 1988); Leo Marx, The 
Idea of “Technology” and Postmodern Pessimism, in TECHNOLOGY, PESSIMISM, AND 
POSTMODERNISM 11 (Yaron Ezrahi, Everett Mendelsohn & Howard Segal eds., 1994); see 
also MARCEL C. LAFOLLETTE, MAKING SCIENCE OUR OWN: PUBLIC IMAGES OF SCIENCE, 
1910–1955 (1990). 
241.  LANDIS, supra note 21, at 31.  It certainly had antecedents in Landis’s work.  See, 
e.g., FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 75, at 153 (arguing that regulation of railways and 
other utilities “turns fundamentally not upon any settled and easily applied legal rules but 
upon judgments of policy resting on an understanding of economic and industrial facts”). 
242.  See infra text accompanying notes 248–53.  
243.  See LANDIS, supra note 21, at 48–49. 
244.  LANDIS, supra note 21, at 67–68.  Indeed, it may be suggested that, basically, to 
Landis, the first concept in the pair is attributed to the agency, while the latter to the forces of 
tradition (conservative judges and lawyers in particular). 
245.  Id. at 88. 
246.  Id. at 48.  Harvey Pinney argued similarly, in response to the Committee’s “strong 
language,” “Independence . . . should be judged by its fruits—not by theoretical abstractions 
applicable in bygone era to a different area of governmental action.”  Pinney, supra note 135, 
at 47; see also Robert H. Jackson, An Organized American Bar, 18 A.B.A. J. 383 (1932).   
247.  Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 91, at 1023. 
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that emanate from “logic-chopping”248 or are advanced by “theorists,”249 
on the one hand, with “practical,” “pragmatic,”250 and realistic251 
arguments, ones that are based on what happens in the “world,”252 on 
the other hand.  Landis distinguished between discourses spoken “in 
terms of reality” and those expressed “in terms of political dogma or of 
righteous abstractions.”253 
The separation between talk and action runs deep in the United 
States.254  This matter-of-fact position was held in high esteem, within 
and without legal circles, in the age of naturalism when (as noted) 
academics were keen on replacing stale absolutes with factual data.  
Suffice it to mention here Roscoe Pound’s Sociological Jurisprudence255 
and “law in books” versus “law in action”256 in the Progressive Era, and 
Thurman Arnold’s “Spiritual vs. Temporal Government”257 at the time 
of the New Deal.  In this respect, Landis was undeniably a man of his 
age. 
Yet enamored as he was with naturalism and facts, Landis could not 
let go of metaphysics, even when the New Deal was in full swing.  
Indeed, as I shall argue below, Landis’s very confidence in 
administrative expertise was steeped in metaphysics.258  Just as 
important, his very staunch belief in the determinacy of facts was a just-
as-clear case of metaphysical thinking.  As Alasdair Macintyre phrased a 
staple objection to naturalism, “Perceivers without concepts, as Kant 
 
248.  LANDIS, supra note 21, at 2. 
249.  Id. at 23.  
250.  Id. at 33. 
251.  Id. at 28. 
252.  Id. at 64. 
253.  Id. at 153. 
254.  See DANIEL T. RODGERS, CONTESTED TRUTHS: KEYWORDS IN AMERICAN 
POLITICS SINCE INDEPENDENCE 7 (1987) (“It has been one of our boasts since the beginning 
of this [twentieth] century that Americans did not go in for abstract thinking.”).  See 
specifically with regard to administrative regulation K.C. Davis’s “practical” (in his own 
words) approach.  He writes of one regulatory initiative endorsed by Congress: “The impetus 
came not from philosophers or theorists, not from abstractions like those about separation of 
powers and supremacy of law, but from such people as leaders of the Granger movement, 
down-to-earth men who were seeking workable machinery for stamping out particular evils.”  
DAVIS, supra note 111, § 1.05.  
255.  See, e.g., Pound, The Place of Procedure in Modern Law, supra note 139.  
256.  Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 454, 465 (1909). 
257.  ARNOLD, supra note 232, at 123–26. 
258.  See infra Part II.G.5. 
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almost said, are blind.”259  This truism did not escape the minds of some 
New Dealers.  Thus, Walter Cook spoke of the “recognition of the 
extent to which all our thinking is based upon underlying postulates of 
which frequently we are entirely unaware but which color all our mental 
processes.”260  Jaffe would embrace this view, applying it more directly 
to administrative expertise.261  He would insightfully speak of “[t]his 
law-making aspect of the fact-finding process[es].”262  As indicated by 
Jaffe’s remark, at issue here are the tricky subjects of regulators’ 
expansive latitude and consequently their ideological disposition.  For 
this reason, undermining the fact/theory dichotomy clearly defeats 
Landis’s attempt to construct a model of neutral expertise; it obviously 
turns his model into a much-less-defensible model of democratically-
legitimate regulation.  As then-Dean Kagan explained—having 
maintained that, according to Landis, “‘expertness’ imposed its own 
guideposts, effectively solving the problem of administrative 
discretion”263— 
 
259.  MACINTYRE, supra note 220, at 79; see PETER MUNZ, BEYOND WITTGENSTEIN’S 
POKER: NEW LIGHT ON POPPER AND WITTGENSTEIN 57–59 (2004) (“[O]bservations which 
were not guided by a prior hypothesis to guide one’s senses in a certain direction could yield 
nothing but confusion.”).  See also JAMES G. MARCH & HERBERT A. SIMON, 
ORGANIZATIONS 151 (1958) (“What a person wants and likes influences what he sees; what 
he sees influences what he wants and likes.”), and the acrimonious exchange between 
Mortimer J. Adler, Legal Certainty, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 91 (1931), and Walter W. Cook, 
Legal Logic, 31 COLUM. L. REV 108 (1931).  Peller, basing his argument of post-structuralism, 
uses a similar argument with direct reference to “constructive” Realism.  Peller, supra note 
232, at 1244 n.20, 1249–50, 1258. 
260.  Walter W. Cook, Scientific Method and the Law, 13 A.B.A. J. 303, 306 (1927); see 
also Charles A. Reich, The Law of the Planned Society, 75 YALE L.J. 1227, 1247 (1966) 
(“[S]cience knows very little about what makes people happy or what adds to the richness and 
satisfaction of life.”); Schwartz, supra note 194, at 472–73; Laski, supra note 210, at 102. 
261.  See Louis L. Jaffe, Invective and Investigation in Administrative Law, 52 HARV. L. 
REV. 1201, 1244–45 (1939) [hereinafter Jaffe, Invective and Investigation in Administrative 
Law].  
262.  Jaffe, Question of Law, supra note 194, at 245.  Other commentators in Jaffe’s days 
would reiterate the same message.  See, e.g., Charles E. Lindblom, The Science of “Muddling 
Through,” 19 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 79, 82 (1959) (“[E]valuation and empirical analysis are 
intertwined . . . .”); see also Reich, supra note 260, at 1242 (“Is not ‘expertise’ merely another 
term for knowledge of facts outside the record plus built-in predispositions?  Is not the 
administrator who is free of such contamination also free of any claim to be an expert?”). 
263.  Kagan, supra note 40, at 2261; see also Frug, supra note 40, at 1318–35; Stewart, 
supra note 40, at 1678 (describing expertise model’s response to the democratic legitimacy 
challenge as predicated on the understanding that “persons subject to the administrator’s 
control are no more liable to his arbitrary will than are patients remitted to the care of a 
skilled doctor”). 
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At the heart of the critique [of this latter perception of Landis] 
lay a growing skepticism about the possibility of neutral or 
objective judgment in public administration.  Whereas the 
questions of what and how to regulate seemed to Landis matters 
of fact and science, they appeared to his detractors, ever more 
numerous as time passed, to involve value choices and political 
judgment, thus throwing into question the legitimacy of 
bureaucratic power.264 
4. “Law Must Be Made to Look Outside Itself” 
“Student, lawyer, teacher, judge tend to narrow their horizon to their 
material,” Landis declared in 1931.265  In this sense they were 
conservatives and not up-to-date with the demands of heavily industrial 
society.  As first order of the day, therefore, Landis declared, “[L]aw 
must be made to look of outside of itself.”266  Landis, however, I will 
now argue, did not meet his own standard.  The book’s study of 
regulation was, in important respects, unrealistic in that it was steeped in 
(certain) idealized perceptions of regulation. 
Landis’s lack of realism surfaces time and again in the book.  
Consider, notably, Landis’s staunch attempt to divide between policy (to 
be handled by agencies) and politics (to be handled by the other 
branches of government) in the business of regulation.267  The divorce 
between politics and policy is put forward in the book with the 
understanding that agencies should engage only in policy.  In most cases 
“the administrative suffers . . . because of its closeness to the political 
branches of government.”268  The separation is between the place where 
social power struggles are conducted (politics) and the meticulous 
 
264.  Kagan, supra note 40, at 2261; see, e.g., Rubenstein, supra note 14, at 2176 (“The 
once heralded ideal of administrative objectivity is now widely regarded as myth.  
Administrative policymaking is now understood to be as much or more about politics as it is 
about expertise and science.” (footnote omitted)); Seidenfeld, supra note 40, at 1520 (“When 
all is said and done, . . . expertise rarely eliminates the need for the agency to choose among 
competing values—a choice that is the essence of political decisionmaking.”); infra note 274.  
Cf. Jaffe’s views, infra text accompanying note 274 (criticizing Landis’s policy/politics 
dichotomy and illustrating Jaffe’s competing view of the matter), and accompanying notes 
316–39, 344 (presenting arguments that regulation is political). 
265.  Landis, The Study of Legislation in Law Schools, supra note 64, at 435. 
266.  Id. 
267.  LANDIS, supra note 21, at 59–60.  
268.  Id. at 60. 
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systematic process of materializing beneficial social goals (policy).269  It 
resurfaces frequently in the text.270 
Now, it is patently difficult to accept a straightforward refusal to 
acknowledge the role played by politics in the shaping of policies.271  
Note Landis’s following description of the dynamic whereby Congress, a 
“political” body, grants power to an agency, a “policy” body.  “[I]t 
should be remembered,” he said, “that the objectives which frequently 
characterize political action may not be too discernable.”272  And Landis 
went on to note: 
Legislation by the democratic method has this tendency.  Wise 
and honest public men may become jointly interested in the need 
for altering the trend in a particular industry.  They will agree 
that, basically, the public interest ought to be the governing 
factor in that industry’s future activities, but, for various reasons, 
they will hold conflicting opinions as to how that public interest 
can best be served.  Legislation, which thus is forced to represent 
compromise, does so by the use of vague phraseology.273 
Reading this description, it is not clear how a subject matter 
becomes apolitical once it is transmitted from a wise and honest 
legislator to a wise and honest regulator.  The vague language of the 
legislation embraces indecision regarding the political issues at stake.  
How, then, could the enforcement of vague legislation by an agency not 
be marred by politics?  As succinctly put by Jaffe, “[A] political conflict 
[cannot] be avoided by relegating a problem to the care of an agency 
and invoking the talisman of ‘expertise.’”274  Thus, if in the previous 
 
269.  See supra text accompanying note 116. 
270.  See supra note 121.  See similarly Landis, Significance of Administrative 
Commissions, supra note 155, at 475–76.  See also HERBERT CROLY, PROGRESSIVE 
DEMOCRACY 360–61 (Transaction Publishers 1988) (1914) (“Representing, as they would, 
the knowledge gained by the attempt to realize an accepted social policy, [administrative 
experts] . . . would be lifted out of the realm of partisan and factious political controversy and 
obtain the standing of authentic social experts.”).  See generally Sagy, Triptych of Regulators, 
supra note 14, at 448–54. 
271.  Landis, Significance of Administrative Commissions, supra note 155, at 480–81 
(“Unquestionably, whereas the ebb and flow of political dominance has on occasion brought 
about an equal ebb and flow in the policies of the executive departments, the administrative 
agencies have pursued a more even course.”). 
272.  LANDIS, supra note 21, at 51.  
273.  Id.  
274.  Jaffe, Illusion of Ideal Administration, supra note 37, at 1190.  Jaffe openly 
acknowledged that regulation was a political business already in 1955.  See Jaffe, Basic Issues, 
supra note 129, at 1283 (“Most rule-making involves the weighing of a complex of 
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Section the idea of a neutral administrative expertise was discredited, 
this Section ends with the resounding understanding that administrative 
policy-making is normally a political business.275  It is clear therefore 
that the sharp distinction between politics and policy is untenable and 
thus cannot serve as a criterion to distinguish the administrative from 
the other branches of government. 
Having dealt with the undergirding assumptions sustaining Landis’s 
description of expertise, the table is now set for us to tackle head-on 
what should be considered the primary source for the book’s failure. 
5. Accounting for Expertise 
We have seen that, according to Landis, the Technician’s expertise is 
based on an intimate acquaintance with facts, out of which regulations 
should emanate.276  But we still do not know how this transition from 
facts to administrative conclusions is to come about.  As noted, Landis 
did not give an account of that process.  It appears as though he believed 
that the mere wallowing (or basking) in the relevant facts for a 
considerable length of time is bound to get the aspiring regulator 
“there.”277 
Thus, Landis, who prided himself on crisp administrative expertise, 
was unable to confirm what makes his administrator—be its type as it 
may—such an expert in regulating the market that the contending 
branches of government must withdraw from the regulatory arena.  
Evidently, Landis’s momentous failure has to be duly noted.  After all, 
the book is the most thorough attempt to conceptualize regulators’ 
expertise.  Landis’s failing strongly suggests, therefore, that any attempt 
at threshing out the essentials of such an assertion of expertise would 
reveal the ineluctability of a residual inexplicable element lying at its 
heart—this something about expertise that we cannot quite close our 
 
considerations, many of them of the kind we call political . . . .”); see also Pound Report, supra 
note 99, at 359 (“The professed ideal of an independent commission of experts above politics 
and reaching scientific results by scientific means, has no correspondence with reality.”).  For 
more recent similar pronouncements, see, for example, CHRIS MOONEY, THE REPUBLICAN 
WAR ON SCIENCE 239–43 (2005); Kagan, supra note 40, at 2261–62; Matthew D. McCubbins, 
Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political 
Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243, 274 (1987) (“Thus, in the end, the politics of the 
bureaucracy will mirror the politics surrounding Congress and the president.”). 
275.  And as I shall note below, there were those who wholeheartedly embraced this 
conclusion.  See infra note 342. 
276.  See Sagy, Triptych of Regulators, supra note 14, at 441. 
277.  See supra note 232 and accompanying text (describing naturalism). 
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fists over.  It lends credence to George Gardner’s observation that “the 
. . . claim of ‘expertness’” is essentially an assertion “of a divine power 
and calling to govern.”278 
Curiously, Landis seemed to be “aware” of the fact that the cure-all 
medicine he prescribed in the book for modern illnesses—expertise—is 
actually a nostrum.  Traces of this line of thought can be found in 
Landis’s discussion of judicial supervision over agencies.  At one point, 
Landis relates parts of the story of the SEC’s “pricking out [by 
regulations] the content of the statutory concept of ‘manipulative, 
deceptive and fraudulent’ devices” in the sale of securities, as provided 
for in the pertinent SEC Act.279  Then, he tells us that the Court ordered 
agencies to explicitly spell out the factual data that led to the adoption 
of certain regulations.280  “How far this suggestion should be taken 
seriously is a matter of considerable doubt,”281 Landis comments, and he 
goes on to explain his reasons for stating so: 
Rules of this character are themselves evidence of administrative 
judgment that the particular conduct embraced by them does 
normally promote fraud and deceit.  A further recital to that 
effect would be a matter of mere formality.[282]  The evidence 
upon which the conclusions that lead to the adoption of such 
rules rests is rarely of a type that is legally admissible . . . .  In the 
main it consists of opinions of men acquainted with the practices 
of the security markets. . . .  But the ultimate judgment of the 
administrative rests on considerations that evolved out of a wide 
range of experience and observation and out of its study of 
security practices.  To set them forth in detail would make a 
treatise on practices in . . . [that] market rather than a limited 
series of recitals.283 
Here, of course, is the rub.  Landis’s statement amounts to openly 
conceding that it is impossible to give an account of the thought process 
that produced a given administrative resolution.  The only 
 
278.  Gardner, supra note 38, at 339.  See similarly infra note 287 and text accompanying 
note 294. 
279.  LANDIS, supra note 21, at 147. 
280.  Id. at 148. 
281.  Id. 
282.  Yet elsewhere in the book Landis named recitals that accompany congressional 
legislation as one significant means “of grasping the legislative thought.” Id. at 67.  But cf. id. 
at 149 n.38. 
283.  Id. at 148–49 (emphasis added). 
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(unreasonable) alternative Landis could think of is the agency writing 
down a treatise specifying all the germane facts spawning the rules in 
question, i.e., the practices of the regulated market.284  Hence, while the 
outcome “evolve[s] out of a wide range of experience and observation 
and out of . . . [a] study of securities practices,” only the last component 
can be accounted for; what is certainly beyond any doubt is the fact that 
this “wide range of experience and observation” cannot be canvassed in 
a “legally admissible” manner.285 
This point thwarts the whole Landisian naturalistic approach.  For in 
his rage at intrusive courts, Landis debunks the conception that the right 
facts alone would somehow yield the right conclusions; after all, he 
acknowledges the central role played by a persistent residual 
“experience” in the administrative process.286  Alas, what this experience 
is remains in the end inscrutable, it appears; for this reason, Laski said in 
1930 that the expert “practices a mystery.”287  
Clearly, the whole Landisian enterprise is at stake in the passage, yet 
it is not James Landis’s momentary inattentiveness that should be 
“blamed” for its far-reaching outcomes.  It is, at least in part, the “fault” 
of the separation between fact and theory—which in itself is a reflection 
of naturalism—and this separation’s role in the book’s discussion.  The 
fact/theory binary opposition is based on the claim of a tangible 
difference between the two: the one begins where the other ends.288  It 
follows that “facts,” the lifeblood of regulation, are—by (Landis’s) 
definition—placed in a theory-less world.  This holds true also to other 
permutations of the dichotomy, such as action/inaction and 
practical/theoretical.  Therefore, as “theorizing” is opposed to 
“doing”—that is, as theory is equated with useless chatter (associated 
with inaction) and diametrically opposed to the practical action—
 
284.  Id. at 149. 
285.  Id. at 148–49 (emphasis added). 
286.  Id. at 149. 
287.  Laski, supra note 210, at 104; see also, e.g., Rudd, supra note 67, at 1058 (describing 
Landis’s argument as predicated on the idea that “the administrative expert’s ‘black box’ 
would solve social problems”); cf. Issachar Rosen-Zvi, Constructing Professionalism: The 
Professional Project of the Israeli Judiciary, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 760, 800, 805–06 (2001). 
288.  Dichotomies, or binary oppositions, occupy a special place in the structuralist 
tradition.  See, e.g., JONATHAN CULLER, STRUCTURALIST POETICS: STRUCTURALISM, 
LINGUISTICS AND THE STUDY OF LITERATURE 14–16 (1975); TERRY EAGLETON, 
LITERARY THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 90 (2d. ed. 1996) (explaining that structuralist 
thinkers explored “universal mental operations . . . such as the making of binary 
oppositions”). 
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nothing of essence could be said about the conditions that brought 
about the administrative action.289  Not unlike the “early” Wittgenstein, 
who most famously said in the Tractatus, “[w]hereof one cannot speak, 
thereof one must be silent,”290 Landis held that whatever is said about 
regulators’ action—the very essence of their expertise—is useless.  Thus 
viewed, Landis had embarked on a book-project en route to nowhere. 
H. The Administrative Process Paradigm(s) Revealed: Conclusion 
We can conclude that the book’s failure was rooted in Landis’s 
neglect to notice the many uncertainties and pervasive metaphysical 
thinking lying at the core of his very own concept(s) of expertise.  The 
same metaphysical thinking was exemplarily expressed by Landis’s co-
author of the securities legislation of the early 1930s, Tom Corcoran,291 
in the course of his testimony on the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 at 
the House Commerce Committee in 1934.  The following dialogue took 
place on that occasion between Corcoran, as a representative of the 
Roosevelt Administration, and one of the House Committee members: 
MR. MAPES.  The law ought to be made to apply to all alike and I 
hate the idea that some man can go on an administrative official 
and get something done that another fellow on the street cannot. 
MR. CORCORAN.  You have to have the power to make rules and 
regulations in every administrative body.  The answer is to pick 
good men on your commissions. 
MR. MAPES.  Well, that sometimes is no answer at all. 
MR. CORCORAN.  It is the ultimate answer to any governmental 
problem.292 
I believe that E.P. Herring best captured the thrust but also the 
insufficiency of the book’s endeavor to duly justify—at Landis’s time, 
 
289.  Cf. Landis’s discussion, LANDIS, supra note 21, at 28, where he states: “[B]lueprint 
symmetry is a poor substitute for realism in organization.”  Indeed, Landis is hoist with his 
own petard for the obvious reason that his is also a “theoretical” discourse. 
290.  LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, TRACTATUS LOGICO-PHILOSOPHICUS ¶ 7 (C.K. Ogden 
trans., 1922). 
291.  On Thomas Corcoran, see supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
292.  JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF THE 
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE 101 (3d 
ed. 2003) (quoting Stock Exchange Regulation: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Interstate 
and Foreign Comm. on H.R. 7852 and H.R. 8720, 73d Cong. (1934) (statement of Thomas G. 
Corcoran)). 
 2014] A BETTER DEFENSE OF BIG WAIVER 749 
but even more so, today—the bulk of what we call “regulation,”293 let 
alone big waiver’s expansive delegation of powers.  He wrote in 1936: 
We want good men but we are unable to define virtue. . . .  We 
do not know just what sphere is proper for these commissions.  
We dare not make them purely expert bodies because we distrust 
experts; we dare not lease them to lawyers because we recognize 
the limitations of the legal approach; we dare not place men of 
vision in command because we know not where their visions may 
take them.294 
At face value, the two passages seem to contradict one another, but 
actually both Corcoran and Herring speak about the universal human 
desire to have things run by the right people.  As revealed in both 
passages—Corcoran’s dialogue with Mapes and Herring’s insightful 
musing—this desire is often tempered by a countervailing 
“disenchantment with the idea of policymaking by expert and 
nonpolitical elites,”295 or anxieties that go to the heart of the democratic-
legitimacy challenge attending regulation: that “important choices of 
social policy” would be made by “politically unresponsive 
administrators.”296 
This “expertise ambiguity” (or “expertise schizophrenia”)—the 
understanding that there are cases where it may be best to let competent 
administrators regulate yet not being “comfortable with the 
administrative state and . . . therefore always demand[ing] that it be 
justified afresh”297—is well reflected in the extant literature, which 
 
293.  For a recent discussion of the various definitions of “regulation,” see David Levi-
Faur, Regulation and Regulatory Governance, in HANDBOOK ON THE POLITICS OF 
REGULATION 3 (David Levi-Faur ed., 2011). 
294.  E. PENDLETON HERRING, FEDERAL COMMISSIONERS: A STUDY OF THEIR 
CAREERS AND QUALIFICATIONS 96 (1936). 
295  Thomas W. Merill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967–1983, 72 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 1039, 1043 (1997) (“[T]he courts’ assertiveness during the period from roughly 1967 to 
1983 can be explained by judicial disenchantment with the idea of policymaking by expert and 
nonpolitical elites.”). 
296.  Indus. Union Dep’t v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 686–87 (1980) 
(Rehnquist, J., concurring in judgment) (“Indeed, a number of observers have suggested that 
this Court should once more take up its burden of ensuring that Congress does not 
unnecessarily delegate important choices of social policy to politically unresponsive 
administrators.”); see also Sagy, Triptych of Regulators, supra note 14, at 458 n.190. 
297.  PETER H. SCHUCK, FOUNDATIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 7 (2d ed. 2004) (“In 
contrast to most of the rest of the world (including most democracies), Americans have never 
been comfortable with the administrative state and have therefore always demanded that it 
be justified afresh.”). 
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explodes with critical assessments of administrative expertise298 while 
clinging to the idea of expertise in the context of central regulatory 
issues.299 
 
298.  See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 263 (citing then-Dean Kagan’s review of 
denunciatory estimates of expertise); supra notes 262, 274 (citing Reich’s and the Pound 
Report’s critical views of administrative expertise, respectively).  See also supra text 
accompanying note 287, where Laski’s skepticism of the very idea of expertise is cited. 
Indeed, as suggested by Laski’s comment, throughout the years, the idea, or ideal, of 
administrative expertise was generally attacked from different angles and on the basis of 
different methodologies.  This Article does not purport to provide a comprehensive account 
of the intellectual history of administrative expertise—for such an account, see Sagy, The 
Manager, the Judge, and the Empiricist, supra note 31—but only to discuss the problems 
raised by one, central model of expertise of one, central regulator and theoretician.  
Hardly exhausting the subject, I will note that already when the book was written, and 
even more so in the following years, scholars pursued two lines of attack on administrative 
expertise, arguing that—  
(1) it was unrealistic to assert that regulators were “experts,” either on account of their 
short term in office or because of the political dynamics of appointments.  See, e.g., 
BERNSTEIN, supra note 134, at 112 (“[O]n the whole commissioners have not inspired 
confidence as outstanding public servants and vigorous defenders and promoters of the public 
interest.”); Caldwell, supra note 98, at 971 (“Like the climate of Los Angeles, theoretically 
this conception of expert commission is perfect.  Sometimes, it is true, experts are appointed, 
but no more than you would expect under the law of averages.”); Pound Report, supra note 
99, at 345; see also HERRING, supra note 294, at 96 (arguing that, although effective, the 
presidential appointment process was “almost casual in its lack of system”).  In fact, 
complaints about the low caliber of commissioners had attended the administrative apparatus 
in the United States already during the nineteenth century.  Charles Francis Adams observed 
in 1871 that commissions “have almost invariably been made up of very inferior and, not 
seldom, corrupt men.”  Charles F. Adams, Jr., The Railroad System, in CHAPTERS OF ERIE 
AND OTHER ESSAYS 333, 428 (1871). 
(2) Concurrently, it was argued that, even if (somehow) administrative expertise took 
root in a certain regulatory setting, it was very doubtful whether the resultant regulation 
would be in the public interest due to (for example) experts’ narrow perspective.  See, e.g., 
ALFRED NORTH WHITEHEAD, SCIENCE AND THE MODERN WORLD 197 (Free Press 1997) 
(1925) (“Effective knowledge is professionalised knowledge, supported by a restricted 
acquaintance with useful subjects subservient to it.  This situation has its dangers.  It produces 
minds in a groove.”).  Interestingly, Marver Bernstein takes issue with Landis on this point 
exactly.  In response to Landis’s positive description of the merits of commissions’ “singleness 
of concern,” LANDIS, supra note 21, at 99, Bernstein turns these words against Landis.  It is, 
again, precisely the “[s]ingleness of concern” of expert regulators he finds so vexing.  
BERNSTEIN, supra note 134, at 119 (emphasis added).  Naturally, also pivotal in this camp was 
the hugely influential literature on capture, which is canvassed, for example, in McCraw, 
supra note 26, and Schiller, supra note 78, at 1405–06.  For an early seminal discussion, see 
Samuel P. Huntington, The Marasmus of the ICC: The Commission, the Railroads, and the 
Public Interest, 61 YALE L.J. 467 (1952). 
299.  An excellent illustration is provided by the vast literature dedicated to the 
immensely central Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 
(1984), and subsequent related cases (notably United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 
(2001)).  See, e.g., Bernard W. Bell, Using Statutory Interpretation to Improve the Legislative 
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Be that as it may, it seems unwise to base big waiver on the 
foundations of a regulatory theory surrounded by ambiguity.  Yet as 
noted, we have not yet reached the final destination in our discussion.  
The next Part will indicate why those seeking to defend big waiver 
should consult the work of Jaffe (rather than that of Landis). 
III. THE JAFFE ALTERNATIVE: AN OVERTURE 
A. Introduction to Jaffe 
Louis Leventhal Jaffe (1905–1996) was undoubtedly one of the most 
original and prolific legal scholars in mid-century America.300  He 
started off as an avowed New Dealer and retired in 1976, bearing the 
title of Harvard Law School’s Byrne Professor of Administrative Law 
Emeritus, as one of the most penetrating critics of the administrative 
process.301  Gradual as his shift away from New Deal regulatory ideas 
had been, by the mid-1950s it could not be denied.302  In a 1954 article, 
he reflected upon “the thinking of the thirties”303 and arrived at 
unfavorable conclusions, which he publicly announced.  “We have, 
 
Process: Can It Be Done in the Post-Chevron Era?, 13 J.L. & POL. 105, 141 (1997) (arguing 
that Chevron’s holding “is a judicial determination that agencies, by virtue of their democratic 
pedigree and expertise, are more competent to interpret ambiguous statutes than are 
courts”); Richard W. Murphy, Judicial Deference, Agency Commitment, and Force of Law, 66 
OHIO ST. L.J. 1013, 1033 (2005) (similarly arguing that, at least in part, Chevron deference is 
based on the fact that “agencies generally possess greater technocratic expertise than 
courts”).  To recall, the Court explicitly invoked agencies’ expertise in its Chevron holding.  
See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865 (“Perhaps [Congress] . . . consciously desired the Administrator 
to strike the balance at this level, thinking that those with great expertise and charged with 
responsibility for administering the provision would be in a better position to do so . . . .”). 
300.  In fact, according to Professor Rodriguez, “In the modern intellectual history of 
American administrative law, one figure looms especially large: Professor Louis Jaffe.”  
Daniel B. Rodriguez, Jaffe’s Law: An Essay on the Intellectual Underpinnings of Modern 
Administrative Law Theory, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1159, 1159 (1997). 
301.  For Jaffe’s biography, see id. at 1162–63; Justice Stephen Breyer, In Memoriam: 
Louis L. Jaffe, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1205 (1997); Nathaniel L. Nathanson, The Contribution of 
Louis L. Jaffe to Administrative Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1667 (1976). 
302.  See Yair Sagy, The Transformation of Louis Jaffe (forthcoming manuscript on file 
with author) [hereinafter Sagy, The Transformation of Louis Jaffe]; see also Nathanson, supra 
note 301; Schiller, supra note 78, at 1398–416.  
303.  Jaffe, A Reevaluation, supra note 94, at 1119; cf., e.g., Jaffe, Invective and 
Investigation in Administrative Law, supra note 261, at 1242 (“[T]he Committee has presented 
almost no proof to support its violent, unmeasured condemnation of the independent 
commissions.”); id. at 1239–40; Louis L. Jaffe, Book Review, 42 COLUM. L. REV. 1382 (1942) 
(reviewing ROSCOE POUND, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: ITS GROWTH, PROCEDURE AND 
SIGNIFICANCE (1942)) (criticizing Pound primarily, but also Pound’s opponents—Jaffe 
explicitly counts himself among them—for their rhetoric). 
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perhaps, succumbed too easily to the siren song of regulation,” he wrote 
of those earlier years.304 
In this Part, I will not provide a conclusive account of Jaffe’s 
scholarly “pilgrimage” (as he himself put it)305 over the years.306  It will 
rather only describe Jaffe’s emergent understanding of regulation as he 
distanced himself from “the thinking of the thirties.”307  Key building 
blocks of his post-New Deal thinking were already mentioned above in 
the course of our critical assessment of Landis’s construction of The 
Administrative Process.308   The discussion below will draw on the 
references made thus far in the Article to Jaffe and elaborate upon 
them.  This Part will be brief and, again, focused only on outlining the 
contours of Jaffe’s “mature” thinking with a view to demonstrating their 
compatibility with, and usefulness for, shoring up such regulatory 
devices as big waiver.309 
B. Snippets of Post-New Deal Jaffe 
Slowly but surely distancing himself from Landis’s expansive model 
of expertise in the 1940s and ‘50s, Jaffe came to embrace a competing 
model for legitimizing the federal administrative apparatus.  It was the 
judicial-review model,310 which he advocated in a long series of 
publications and for which he is best remembered.311  As Jaffe probably 
 
304.  Jaffe, A Reevaluation, supra note 94, at 1134.  
305.  Louis L. Jaffe, A Pilgrimage: Reflections on a Career in Administrative Law, 45 
IND. L.J. 171 (1970). 
306.  For such an account, see Sagy, The Transformation of Louis Jaffe, supra note 302. 
307.  Therefore, any mention of “Jaffe” in the ensuing paragraphs should usually be 
read as “post-New Deal Jaffe.” 
308.  See supra text accompanying notes 144, 263, 275. 
309.  Jaffe’s “pilgrimage” could undoubtedly be told along different lines than those of 
my narrative.  See notably the insightful discussion in Schiller, supra note 78, at 1398–416, in 
which Jaffe’s change of heart regarding the administrative process is seen to mirror the 
broader intellectual shift from postwar “interest group pluralism” to the “participatory 
administration” of later decades.  As will become evident below, while different in important 
respects, the trajectory charted by Professor Schiller clearly parallels the trajectory charted in 
this Article.  Noticeably, both highlight the emerging democratic-participatory undertone in 
Jaffe’s late thinking (yet each paper anchors that change in Jaffe’s thinking elsewhere).  
310.  For general overviews and critique of the judicial review model, see Frug, supra 
note 40, at 1334–55; Rodriguez, supra note 300; Rubenstein, supra note 14, at 2187–99; 
Stewart, supra note 40, at 1675, 1678–80. 
311.  A great many of Jaffe’s articles were assembled in LOUIS L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL 
CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION (1965). 
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had hoped, his model did indeed ruffle Landis’s neat vision of public 
regulation.  That was the way he put it in 1958: 
The guarantee of legality by an organ independent of the 
executive is one of the profoundest, most pervasive premises of 
our system.  Indeed I would venture to say that it is the very 
condition which makes possible, which makes so accessible, the 
wide freedom of our administrative system, and gives it its 
remarkable vitality and flexibility.312 
The gist of the judicial-review model is that the courts’ independent 
review of agencies provides the needed footing for anchoring 
administrative actions.313  More accurately, given the fact that review is 
not always sought or granted, Jaffe argues that it is the presumption of 
reviewability that serves the purpose.314  Reviewability was therefore 
pivotal in his conception of regulation.  
Another pillar in the theoretical edifice erected by Jaffe in the 
course of his career was the conviction that regulation was a through-
and-through political occupation.315  Simply put, as opposed to Landis 
(and many other lawyers),316 according to Jaffe regulation is—and 
should be317—more a matter of politics and less of expertise.  “Most 
rule-making,” Jaffe explained in 1955,  
involves the weighing of a complex of considerations, many of 
them of the kind we call political; the judgments to be made are 
judgments of more or less, of feasibility, of prognosis.  Ordinarily 
such decisions are the product of the staff—the technical officers 
embodying special knowledge and continuity of experience—
and the political officers who must rely on the technical 
experience of the staff, but temper and direct it.318 
 
312.  Louis L. Jaffe, The Right to Judicial Review (pt. 1), 71 HARV. L. REV. 401, 406 
(1958). 
313.  See, e.g., id. at 405 (“[W]e, in common with nearly all of the Western countries, 
have concluded that the maintenance of legitimacy [of an agency’s action] requires a judicial 
body independent of the active administration.”). 
314.  See id. at 423–37. 
315.  Sagy, The Manager, the Judge, and the Empiricist, supra note 31, at 312. 
316.  See id. at 308–43 (“Louis Jaffe: The Realist of Realists”).  
317.  See infra text accompanying note 344. 
318.  Jaffe, Basic Issues, supra note 129, at 1283; see also Louis L. Jaffe, The Federal 
Regulatory Agencies in Perspective: Administrative Limitations in a Political Setting, 11 B.C. 
INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 565, 567 (1970) [hereinafter Jaffe, Agencies in Perspective] (“The 
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A third component in Jaffe’s “mature” thinking was its relativistic 
undertone.  In short, while at first the rise of relativism startled 
Americans and wreaked havoc on American academia, it was eventually 
embraced, especially during the Cold War, and relied upon in drawing a 
contrast between the (“relativistic” and democratic) West and the 
(“absolutist” and tyrannical) East.319  Thus, the division between 
“relativism” and “absolutism” dominated political and social thinking in 
the United States up to the end of the 1950s.  It was, again, the former 
view that ultimately emerged triumphant.  At the height of the Cold 
War, Americans made ample use of the relativism/absolutism binary, 
arguing that dogmatism and absolutism ruled in the Soviet Union while 
the United States relished in social experimentation, diversity, popular 
participation in government, and freedom.  “Relativist democratic 
theory and the cold war,” concludes Edward Purcell, “were mutually 
reinforcing.”320 
Based on these and other above-mentioned theoretical components, 
Jaffe’s scholarly trajectory can be described in the following terms: 
rejecting the naïve naturalistic viewpoint, replacing it with the rising 
relativistic justification of democracy, and acknowledging that 
regulation was a political business, Jaffe prescribed a “relativistic” and 
thus decentralized, non-exclusive, and participatory mechanism of 
regulation, which was open to all branches of government.  In keeping 
with this approach, he insisted already in 1955 that 
[i]n no case is independence absolute nor should it be.  Every 
organ of government in a democracy—even the Supreme 
Court—is bottomed on representativeness. . . .  If the 
Commission [(here, the ICC)] has for decision an issue no one—
least of all the President—should be silenced.  The Commission’s 
independence lies in its power to choose, not in its power to not 
hear.321 
In so holding, he clearly rejected the New Dealers’ prototypical 
scheme of the division of labor within the administrative state, which 
accorded a commanding position to administrative commissions and 
 
stuff of great public policy controversies is basically political and can only be solved in the 
political arena.”); supra text accompanying note 274; infra text accompanying note 341. 
319.  See PURCELL, supra note 220, at 238–39; see also Sagy, The Transformation of 
Louis Jaffe, supra note 302. 
320.  PURCELL, supra note 220, at 239; see also id. at 200–02, 265–66. 
321.  Jaffe, Invective and Investigation in Administrative Law, supra note 261, at 1240. 
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advocated their independence.322  One should note that on this reading 
of Jaffe’s overall work the contribution of the courts to the 
administrative apparatus was but one, albeit central, element in a multi-
vocal administrative process.323  Further, the democratic-participatory 
worldview was plainly premised on a limited conception of agency 
expertise for at least two reasons.  First, as suggested, such a limited 
conception was the order of the day, as “America’s encounter with the 
bureaucratic totalitarianism of Hitler and Stalin sullied the promise of 
expert administration.”324  Second, a robust, open conversation could be 
had only if the relevant knowledge informing it were deemed accessible 
to all colloquists.  As we have noted, assertions of “strong,” expansive 
administrative expertise, however, are essentially warning signs; they 
tend to narrow the scope of deliberation; they are inimical to a 
cooperative-participatory approach to public regulation.325 
What Jaffe understood, and welcomed, was that a system of checks 
and balances allows for only a limited sphere of expertise.326  Apart from 
the assumption that regulators could err, the very idea of (meaningful) 
judicial review implies that regulators’ decisions can be meaningfully 
reviewed by others; the greater the reviewable scope, the more check 
and balance there is.  However, as suggested by Laski, the greater that 
scope is, the smaller the reputed expertise.327  Jaffe was pleased with this 
result.  He was wary of absolute, metaphysical assertions of the sort 
Landis had made with regard to the expert administrator.328  It seems 
that especially during the Cold War, Jaffe, like other prominent thinkers 
around him (like John Dewey and Reinhold Niebuhr),329 believed that 
 
322.  Id. at 1242; see also supra note 121. 
323.  See supra text accompanying note 321; infra text accompanying note 344. 
324.  Schiller, supra note 78, at 1404. 
325.  See Rudd, supra note 67, at 1058 (arguing that Landis’s “new administrative order 
reduced public participation by narrowing the field of qualified opinions to those held by 
‘experts’”). 
326.  Compare supra text accompanying note 103 (describing Landis’s position), with 
Jaffe, Question of Law, supra note 194, at 275 (“The very subordination of the agency to 
judicial jurisdiction is intended to proclaim the premise that each agency is to be brought into 
harmony with the totality of the law . . . .”). 
327.  See supra text accompanying note 210 (“The expert . . . remains expert upon the 
condition that he does not seek to coordinate his specialism with the total sum of human 
knowledge.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Laski, supra note 210, at 105)). 
328.  See supra Part II.G.5.  See also the sources cited supra note 302 (detailing Jaffe’s 
“pilgrimage”). 
329.  See, e.g., JOHN DEWEY, FREEDOM AND CULTURE 102 (Capricorn Books 1963) 
(1939) (“[F]reedom of inquiry, toleration of diverse views, freedom of communication, the 
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the more cacophonous the institutionalized conversation was allowed to 
be, the more relativist, and thus the freer, society was.330  Taking into 
account the problem of perspective—that is, the fact that human 
knowledge is “invariably tainted with an ‘ideological’ taint of interest,” 
as Niebuhr put it331—a multi-vocal process of deliberation was also 
projected to produce salutary social ends.332  Surely, again, this line of 
reasoning depended on a modest perception of administrative, and any 
other, expertise. 
It may be thus said that, while Jaffe endorsed Landis’s position that 
every branch of government had an expertise of its own, he endorsed it 
with one important modification.  Landis thought that the territorial 
spread of each branch’s authority must be strictly conterminous with its 
unique expertise, so that the administrative process would be neatly 
compartmentalized and “boarder disputes” among the branches 
minimized.333  Jaffe, on the other hand, came to advocate a multi-party, 
participatory, and inclusive view of the administrative process, a process 
whose boundaries were more amorphous.334  To Landis the recognition 
in diversity of expertise allowed for a comfortable disengagement 
among the branches.  As Jaffe saw it, it allowed for a rich and 
multifaceted public dialogue. 
I believe Professor Cynthia Farina’s following cri de coeur reflects a 
sentiment that Jaffe held dear: “[W]e have a common stake in 
articulating a vision of the regulatory state that encourages us to 
understand legitimacy and competence as a collaborative enterprise that 
 
distribution of what is found out to every individual as the ultimate intellectual consumer, are 
involved in the democratic as in the scientific method.”); REINHOLD NIEBUHR, THE 
CHILDREN OF LIGHT AND THE CHILDREN OF DARKNESS: A VINDICATION OF DEMOCRACY 
AND A CRITIQUE OF ITS TRADITIONAL DEFENSE 70–71 (1944) (“The reason this final 
democratic freedom is right . . . is that there is no historical reality, whether it be church or 
government, whether it be the reason of wise men or specialists, which is not involved in the 
flux and relativity of human existence; which is not subject to error and sin, and which is not 
tempted to exaggerate its errors and sins when they are made immune to criticism.”). 
330.  Note that at this point Jaffe diverged from orthodox science of administration, 
whose first article of faith was Executive enhancement and the exclusion of the other 
branches of government from executive duties.  See supra note 147.  
331.  2 REINHOLD NIEBUHR, THE NATURE AND DESTINY OF MAN: A CHRISTIAN 
INTERPRETATION 214 (one vol. ed. 1949). 
332.  This theme was developed already in the late-1950s, notably in the seminal 
Lindblom, supra note 262.  Cf. Colin S. Diver, Policymaking Paradigms in Administrative 
Law, 95 HARV. L. REV. 393 (1981). 
333.  See supra Part II.D.2 (describing Landis’s institutional competence analysis). 
334.  See supra note 318. 
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must be pursued through a variety of official actors and institutional 
practices.”335 
 Finally, it was, among other things, Jaffe’s exceptional realism that 
set him apart from Landis.336  Jaffe was indeed exceptionally realistic 
compared to his colleagues when it came to regulation.  By “realist” I 
mean simply that he went further than other jurisprudents in rejecting 
idealized visions of public regulation and its mechanics, which lawyers 
like Landis could not let go of.337  More often than not, lawyers had 
looked at agencies from the top, unheeding the lower echelons of the 
administrative process, or simply confined themselves to courts’ 
perspective on the administrative apparatus.338  Jaffe, conversely, 
attended to the actual workings of the administrative process and took 
interest also in the organizational perspective of regulation.339  Viewed 
through this prism, the process revealed itself to Jaffe as political in the 
plainest sense of the word. 
Jaffe applied his realism to his own thinking.  Putting much stress on 
personal predilections and political preferences in the carrying out of 
regulation, it was Jaffe himself who indicated the limitations of one of 
his claims to fame, namely, of the judicial-review model.340  In 1970 he 
declared, “[J]udicial activities continue to be of great importance in 
stimulating and guiding the agencies in their new endeavors.  But 
ultimately the conflict of interests which lie at the bottom of most of the 
great controversies must be resolved by the more particular political 
 
335.  Farina, supra note 100, at 238. 
336.  Cf. supra Part II.G.4. 
337.  See Sagy, Triptych of Regulators, supra note 14, at 431 n.22, 459–62.  
338.  See, e.g., Susan Rose-Ackerman, Progressive Law and Economics—And the New 
Administrative Law, 98 YALE L.J. 341, 347 (1988) (“American administrative law remains a 
court-centered field . . . .”); Richard B. Stewart, U.S. Administrative Law: A Model for Global 
Administrative Law?, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 72 (2005); see also Steven P. Croley, 
Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative Process, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 25–31 
(1998); Cass R. Sunstein, Paradoxes of the Regulatory State, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 407, 408–09 
(1990) (“In even the most prominent evaluations of the performance of the regulatory state, 
explorations of the real world consequences of regulatory intervention are strikingly 
infrequent.”). 
339.  For Jaffe’s acute realism, see Rodriguez, supra note 300, at 1166–69 (describing 
Jaffe’s critique of the shortcomings of the administrative process); Sagy, The Transformation 
of Louis Jaffe, supra note 302. 
340.  For such critical discussions, see sources cited supra note 310. 
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process represented by administrative and legislative power.”341  This was 
the end-point in the pilgrimage of Louis Jaffe: administrative agencies’ 
importance primarily lies no more in the distinct expertise they are able 
to offer to society, but rather in the political services they render to it.342 
C. Conclusion: Jaffe in Defense of Big Waiver 
It seems that big waiver has quite a lot in common with Jaffe’s 
“relativist” vision of regulation.  Several central features of waiver 
regulation immediately come to mind.  I begin with a distinct feature 
that seems to be particularly controversial343: big waiver’s cooperative 
and dialogic nature.  As emphasized by Professor Bagenstos, at the 
heart of “federalism by waiver”344 are “cooperative state-federal 
spending statutes . . . [that] giv[e] states space to experiment with new 
means of achieving the goals of those statues.”345  This characterization 
is closely tied to the fact that waiver regimes are decentralized,346 or at 
least less centralized, in their very nature—certainly when compared to 
top-down, uniform, hierarchical, often rigid command-and-control 
regulation.347 
 
341.  Jaffe, Agencies in Perspective, supra note 318, at 569 (emphasis added); see also, 
e.g., BERNSTEIN, supra note 134, at 161 (“Only in a totalitarian society is the general welfare 
a matter of private, nonpolitical concern.”). 
342.  Jaffe, Illusion of Ideal Administration, supra note 37, at 1188.  Following this 
approach, Jaffe noted in 1973, “Indeed, the criticisms of administration must be recognized as 
themselves a component of the political process, and critics’ invocation of the ‘public interest’ 
as a standard with readily discoverable content should be viewed as but a useful tactic in the 
political debate.”  Id. at 1191.  Jaffe took this piece of wisdom to heart when it came to his 
own positions as well.  See id. at 1197 (“[Previous] descriptions of the administrative process 
. . . may express a political bias, as may be true of this attempt to correct them.”). 
343.  Compare Richard A. Epstein, Government by Waiver, NAT’L AFFAIRS, Spring 
2011, at 39, 40 (decrying “the risks that come with the [government’s] power to create 
exceptions and to grant dispensations”), with Bagenstos, supra note 1, at 228 (emphasizing 
the great potentials of “cooperative state-federal spending statutes”). 
344.  Hugh Heclo, Poverty Politics, in CONFRONTING POVERTY: PRESCRIPTIONS FOR 
CHANGE 396, 415 (Sheldon H. Danziger, Gary D. Sandefur & Daniel H. Weinberg eds., 
1994). 
345.  Bagenstos, supra note 1, at 228. 
346.  Id. at 238 (“Reliance on the waiver mechanism helps to realize many of the 
benefits of decentralization—notably the benefits of experimentation and accounting for 
local variation—within the context of a national program.”). 
347.  On command-and-control regulation and its critiques, see, for example, Rena I. 
Steinzor, Reinventing Environmental Regulation: The Dangerous Journey from Command to 
Self-Control, 22 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 103, 103–18 (1998), and Stewart, Administrative Law 
in the Twenty-First Century, supra note 171, at 446–48, 454.  Indeed, Barron and Rakoff 
explicitly argue, based on the fact that big waiver allows for “relaxing strictures on what states 
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Another element of waiver that must be mentioned here is that it is 
based on the understanding that in many cases it is wrong to assume ex 
ante that one organ of government—even if it is a specialized federal 
regulatory agency—would get it right.  Indeed, big waiver regimes’ 
commitment to experimentation may be said to spell their skepticism 
that there is an a priori right answer to a regulatory problem.  No 
wonder, then, that Barron and Rakoff are open to the option that “[i]f, 
for example, Congress wanted to allow for waiver partly to encourage 
experimentation among those who are regulated, it might make sense to 
allow for waiver when a proposed option is as good as, though not 
necessarily better than, the specified statutory pattern.”348 
Post-New Deal Jaffe came to espouse a vision of regulation much in 
line with such an experimental, cooperative, decentralized—in a word, 
relativistic—approach to regulation.  Supporters of big waiver, 
therefore, should look to him and to his post-New Deal way of thinking 
as sources of inspiration,349 rather than seek support in the unitary, 
naturalistic, deterministic, allegedly-non-political,350 and socially 
“stratified”351 world of The Administrative Process.     
IV. CONCLUSION 
This Article’s point of departure was that the regulatory instrument 
of big waiver is crucially important not just in its own right but also 
because it represents a distinct, new regulatory age in the United States.  
Barron and Rakoff’s defense of big waiver should therefore be 
 
and localities may do,” that big waiver “is here to stay.”  Barron & Rakoff, supra note 1, 
at 301. 
348.  Barron & Rakoff, supra note 1, at 332. 
349.  It is important here to put things in perspective as this Part and the entire Article 
draw to a close.  Since the discussion in the Article revolved mainly around the issue of 
legitimate regulation, see supra note 51, its concluding observations—including, of course, the 
argument about Jaffe’s probable endorsement of big waiver—should not be read as an 
endorsement of every form of big waiver nor of every detail of big waiver regulatory 
arrangements.  Accord Barron & Rakoff, supra note 1, at 335–37 (differentiating between 
“well developed” extant waiver provisions and “poorly thought out” provisions). 
More specifically with regard to Jaffe—the father of the judicial-review model, see supra 
text accompanying notes 310–12—we can assume that generally he would have sympathized 
with Kate Bowers’ concerns regarding “limitations on judicial review contained in some 
waiver provisions.”  Bowers, supra note 1, at 298; see also id. at 297–301 (explaining her 
concerns). 
350.  See supra Part II.G.4. 
351.  Rudd, supra note 67, at 1085 (“James Landis sketched a stratified social 
world . . . .”). 
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commended both for identifying the advent of the new age of big waiver 
as well as for making a serious attempt at legitimizing it.  As the Article 
demonstrated, however, this attempt has been misguided.  In particular, 
instead of resorting to James Landis and The Administrative Process, 
Barron and Rakoff should have turned to Jaffe’s work to defend waiver 
regulation. 
As we have seen, Barron and Rakoff’s entire construction is based 
on a particular reading of the Landisian corpus and of The 
Administrative Process.  By illustrating that these perceptions are 
flawed, the Article exposes key weaknesses of the defense offered by 
Barron and Rakoff to big waiver.  Since Landis’s work has exerted 
outstanding influence on the regulation literature in the United States,352 
this Article’s critical and innovative study of Landis is relevant to the 
work of a great many other scholars and  in various regulatory contexts. 
As was also demonstrated in the Article, rather than basing their 
defense of big waiver on Landis, sympathizers of big waivers, including 
Barron and Rakoff, should have turned to Jaffe, the leading 
administrative law scholar of the post-New Deal era, whose theories of 
regulation are more compatible with big waiver and similar regulatory 
techniques.  Jaffe’s work, I have argued, offers a superior defense of big 
waiver.  Simply put, post-New Deal Jaffe’s thinking is more in tune with 
the American zeitgeist of today, especially with regard to the role of 
government and the level of trust in government.  The shift away from 
the Landisian world of regulation, which has been a decisive move 
toward Jaffe’s world, manifested itself with the now-commonplace post-
command-and-control regulation.353  This shift, which is exemplified by 
big waiver’s increasing popularity,354 should serve as a clear indication 
that the top-down, uniform, and centralized model of regulation, 
espoused in The Administrative Process, has lost much of its luster.  At 
the same time, this move toward a decentralized, check-and-balance, 
multi-party mode of regulation indicates how relevant Jaffe’s thinking is 
to our age, the big waiver age.  Therefore, the proposal to found big 
waiver and like administrative tools on Jaffe, rather than on Landis, is 
not a mere quibble or a nicety.  It is undoubtedly vital for the regulatory 
enterprise of today, especially if, as maintained by Barron and Rakoff, 
 
352.  See infra note 40 and accompanying text. 
353.  See supra note 347. 
354.  See Barron & Rakoff, supra note 1, at 299–301 (“The Waning Appeal of Command 
and Control Regulation”). 
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big waiver is poised to be “foundational to modern administrative 
governance.”355 
 
355.  Id. at 341 (“[B]ig waiver is just as foundational to modern administrative 
governance—or, on the way to becoming so—[as traditional delegation] . . . .”); see also id. at 
285 (“[W]aiver provisions become of central import—in much the way that grants of 
rulemaking power once were—to the future direction a given regulatory framework will 
take . . . .”). 
